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Air traffic demand is growing. New methods of airspace design are required
that can enable new designs, do not depend on current operations, and can also
support quantifiable performance goals. The main goal of this thesis is to develop
methods to model inherent safety and control cost so that these can be included
as principal objectives of airspace design, in support of prior work which examines
capacity. The first contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate two applications of
airspace analysis and design: assessing the inherent safety and control cost of the
airspace. Two results are shown, a model which estimates control cost depending on
autonomy allocation and traffic volume, and the characterization of inherent safety
conditions which prevent unsafe trajectories. The effects of autonomy ratio and traf-
fic volume on control cost emerge from a Monte Carlo simulation of air traffic in an
airspace sector. A maximum likelihood estimation identifies the Poisson process to
be the best stochastic model for control cost. Recommendations are made to support
control-cost-centered airspace design. A novel method to reliably generate collision
avoidance advisories, in piloted simulations, by the widely-used Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is used to construct unsafe trajectory clusters.
Results show that the inherent safety of routes can be characterized, determined,
and predicted by relatively simple convex polyhedra (albeit multi-dimensional and
involving spatial and kinematic information). Results also provide direct trade-off
relations between spatial and kinematic constraints on route geometries that preserve
safety. Accounting for these clusters thus supports safety-centered airspace design.
The second contribution of the thesis is a general methodology that generalizes unify-
ing principles from these two demonstrations. The proposed methodology has three
vi
steps: aggregate data, synthesize lean model, and guide design. The use of lean mod-
els is a result of a natural flowdown from the airspace view to the requirements. The
scope of the lean model is situated at a level of granularity that identifies the macro-
scopic effects of operational changes on the strategic level. The lean model technique
maps low-level changes to high-level properties and provides predictive results. The
use of lean models allows the mapping of design variables (route geometry, autonomy
allocation) to design evaluation metrics (inherent safety, control cost).
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Air traffic demand is growing. It is widely believed that air traffic in the US and
Europe will reach capacity limits in the near future [88]. With limited airspace
capacity to handle traffic, the forecast points to a National Airspace System (NAS)
with ever-increasing congestion.
Many technological improvements are being developed and implemented to ad-
dress the capacity issues faced in the NAS. Technological innovations such as ADS-
B and datalinks have the potential to expand the capabilities of, and reduce the
constraints on stakeholders of the system. For example, ADS-B provides detailed
information to pilots about their surrounding traffic, and thus could potentially re-
lieve controllers of their roles in traffic surveillance, conflict detection and resolution,
or more general route planning and traffic separation [44]. Much of the focus has
been on these new technologies, which are poised to overcome present-day systemic
limitations.
But solely focusing on novel technology development leads to a limited perspec-
tive. In the past, technology was indeed the limiting factor of achievable operational
concepts. Current air traffic operations have slowly evolved with incremental and
localized changes, without fundamentally overhauling their paradigm since the ad-
vent of radar. Present operations are thus predicated by historical technology con-
straints [42].
However, technological capability is no longer the primary concern. Adapting
operations to technology should therefore not be a goal in itself. Many possible
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computerized systems can be imagined and implemented, and a reasoned process to
support informed design decisions is needed. Air traffic operations must change to
ensure performance, rather than focus on integrating technology. For example, it
has been observed that traffic demands are spatially and temporally heterogeneous,
at times leaving substantial regions of the NAS with underutilized resources while
capacities become saturated in other regions [174]. Yet current regulations and pro-
cedures do not provide enough flexibility to dynamically transfer resources. To achieve
performance goals, systemic paradigm shifts must therefore occur in the way airspace
is operated. Some of the presumed requirements are modified route infrastructures
and procedures that give more autonomy to aircraft and flight crews, and rely on
higher-precision trajectories and operations [45].
Thus, this thesis focuses on the key challenge of altering airspace design. Current
airspace is structured by airways and jet routes [48]. However, as more aircraft
travel along these paths, their limitations become apparent with bottlenecks and
delays forming at intersections. In addition to increasing numbers of traditional
aircraft, the near-term emergence of new types of aircraft such as very light jets and
unmanned aerial systems is likely to contribute to significant increase in the density
and complexity of air traffic as well as in the operational requirements [47]. These
changes contribute to rendering present airspace design inadequate.
Methods for airspace design must account for such new concepts of operations.
While most if not all of the existing systematic approaches to airspace design are
grounded in current operations [48], the Federal Aviation Administration has been
promoting innovation in the structure and operation of the NAS, focusing on improv-
ing the airspace capacity along with efficiency and the enhancement of mobility. De-
fined under the coordination of the Joint Planning and Development Office [77], and
supported by significant efforts from the FAA [45] and other agencies, the NextGen
concept of operations involves a paradigm shift from a fixed airspace structure to a
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fluid airspace. Thus, there is a need for methods that can enable new designs, do
not rely on current operations in their assumptions, and can also support quantifi-
able performance goals. To that end, predictive and parsimonious models of airspace
under new paradigms are needed.
1.2 Problem statement
This thesis focuses on problem of airspace design. Paradigm changes must occur in
the way airspace is operated. Consequently, airspace design methods and models
should have three characteristics: integrate additional objectives, support a range of
concepts of operations, and be predictive.
First, models that can integrate additional design objectives differ from past ap-
proaches. In the past, airspace planning has focused on capacity and delay improve-
ments through flow management, with the inclusion of taskload and safety as con-
straints [85]. In such past approaches, complexity limitations and the ambiguity of
possible metrics have been identified as factors limiting the scope of airspace design.
Future airspace design methods must overcome these limitations and include taskload
and safety alongside capacity as core objectives of airspace design.
Second, to support a range of potential future concepts of operation, design meth-
ods and models must not be pinned to current operations. However, no systematic
design methods exist which are not conceptually reliant on current operations [27].
Indeed, methods of air traffic assessment are directly related to past and present
operational expertise [63]. Where design methods speculate with future concepts
of operation, an a priori design of airspace is assumed and constructs of safety or
taskload are estimated.
Third, predictive models are needed to guide airspace design and enable new
design methods. These methods of airspace design must involve a more advanced
degree of formalization and logical deduction to predict system behavior and map
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interscale effects on the system. For this, predictive and parsimonious models of
airspace under new paradigms are a necessary step.
This thesis introduces the concept of lean models and demonstrates their use in
airspace design. Lean models are defined by four characteristics: they are compact
descriptors, have forecasting ability, can guide systematic airspace design, and require
low computational cost for use online.
1.3 Scope
This section provides a general definition of the concepts of the research, and the
scope of the thesis.
The term airspace refers to an abstract construct defined by route geometry,
autonomy allocation, and traffic levels. The geographical extent of the airspace in this
thesis corresponds to approximately a large airspace sector, roughly 150 nautical miles
across. The focus is on the enroute portion of flight, and is concerned with strategic
decisions. The design scale is at the route and flow level, not that of individual
aircraft. For the purpose of the thesis, the flows in the airspace are modeled as
the edges of a network. The flow intersections are nodes in the network. Figure 1
illustrates the spatial extent of the airspace.
Two design variables parametrize this vision of the airspace: the geometry of the
flows, and the delegated autonomy and authority for separation. The flow geometry
captures the spatial position of the flow centroids, the velocity constraints that aircraft
must follow inside the flow, the bounds for tolerated deviation away from the centroid,
and the traffic volume supported by each flow. The autonomy captures the capability,
authority and responsibility for trajectory determination by the aircraft. The routing
decisions are on a strategic level. More specifically, aircraft are able to select the
edges they wish to follow through a limited network of flows.
Three metrics are relevant to the perspective taken in the thesis: control cost,
4
















Figure 1: The airspace construct
inherent safety, and capacity. Control cost captures the requirements to control the
airspace system, to avoid degradation and to maintain stability. Inherent safety is
a characteristic of a route structure which is insensitive to predictable errors and
deviations in aircraft separation. Capacity is the amount of traffic the airspace can
support. The design variables and metrics are further discussed in Section 2.4.
1.4 Objectives and contributions
The main goal of this thesis is to propose and apply a methodology and models
for airspace design that are not reliant on the current operational paradigm, for
example by including additional objectives in the airspace design. The work is based
on a concept of operations that is realistic in the medium-term and accounts for
practical concerns. The premise of the thesis is to consider capacity as one of several
objectives of airspace design. Traditionally safety and taskload have been modeled
as constraints. However, it is possible to design the airspace for inherent safety
and control cost as objectives alongside capacity. By adopting this premise, we go
from optimizing capacity of the airspace to including triple factors of inherent safety,
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control cost, and capacity as objectives.
Contribution 1: Demonstration of a model which estimates control cost depending
on autonomy allocation and traffic volume, and a method for generating a route
structure with inherent safety to prevent unsafe trajectories.
Contribution 2: A methodology where data mining and aggregation are used offline
to synthesize models or classes of properties of the system. These compact
descriptors can then be used to design the airspace and rapidly iterate. Their
main benefit is requiring scarce computational resources for use online. The
offline generation can be heavy but only needs to be performed once.
The research presented in this thesis has led to several publications. At the time
of writing, the author of this thesis is the main author on one journal paper which has
been accepted for publication [123], one journal paper which is under review [121],
and three conference papers which he has presented [120,122,124]. The author of the
thesis is also a main co-author on a fourth conference paper [100], and has contributed
to the research resulting in three additional conference papers [132–134], for which
he is listed as co-author.
1.5 Position within a systems engineering perspective
This thesis is meant to support airspace design, and must therefore consider complex
systems of systems (SoS). A SoS is defined as “a set or arrangement of systems that
results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that
delivers unique capabilities. Both individual systems and SoS conform to the accepted
definition of a system in that each consists of parts, relationships, and a whole that
is greater than the sum of the parts” [32].
To describe system development lifecycles, systems engineering practitioners have
formalized different models [22, 49]. A generic vertical decomposition going from the
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most conceptual to the most applied level of abstraction starts with defining the
requirements, designing the architecture, designing the detailed components, then
integrating the system, and finishing by the verification and validation.
Figure 2 shows how this thesis fits within a systems engineering endeavor. The
thesis scope presented in Section 1.3 situates the research in the left arm of the
decomposition. The proposed concept of operations and triple objectives of design
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 reframe the airspace design problem, thus essentially
establishing new requirements. The two contributions of the thesis follow at a more
applied level. The demonstrations in Chapters 3 and 4 make up the detailed design,
while the unifying methodology in Chapter 5 is a formalization of the architecture.
Figure 2: Systems engineering decomposition
1.6 Thesis outline
The thesis begins by reframing the airspace design problem in Chapter 2. To support
this novel formulation, the proposed concept of operations is defined. Traditionally
7
safety and taskload have been hard constraints, recognized as essential but not ex-
plicitly modeled as objective functions. The thesis argues in favor of a paradigm shift.
Under a new perspective, the metrics of inherent safety and control cost, as well as
capacity, can be proactively accounted for in airspace design.
The thesis introduces the first contribution through the demonstrations in Chap-
ters 3 and 4, respectively. The thesis shows, by example, how control cost and inherent
safety can become objectives in airspace design. The scope of the work is restricted
to the context of the aforementioned concept of operations. Two predictive technical
solutions, for control cost and inherent safety, are shown to support this objective.
The thesis continues with its second contribution in Chapter 5. This chapter
formulates of unifying principles from the two applications and defines a methodol-
ogy. By definition, a methodology is a guideline system for solving a problem, with
specific components such as postulates, techniques and tools. This methodology sup-
ports airspace design by constructing compact models which can be used to identify
problems and limitations or recommend improvements. The methodology synthesizes
data, extracts simple models, and reduces the problem complexity to manipulate de-
sign parameters. It is this methodology which enables the examples successfully
implemented for inherent safety and control cost. The thesis ends with concluding
remarks in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER II
REFRAMING THE AIRSPACE DESIGN PROBLEM
This chapter presents a reformulation of the airspace design problem. Traditionally,
improving capacity has been focus of airspace design, with safety and taskload serving
as constraints. The capacity-centric traditional view is discussed in Section 2.1. This
thesis shows it is possible to design the airspace for additional objectives, although
Section 2.2 explains that including including constructs such as taskload and safety
in the design process is not an easy problem. To that end, a concept of operations
with two metrics, inherent safety and control cost, are introduced in Section 2.3.
2.1 Traditional capacity-centric view
Capacity improvements have historically been the motivation for technological and
operational changes. By improving capacity, it is expected that present and future
demand can be accommodated with a reduction in delays and savings in associated
costs such as fuel expenses. The estimation of enroute sector capacity is especially im-
portant in high-density traffic areas, since congestion has been shown to increase the
sensitivity to disturbance of traffic flow management performance [162]. Approaches
that recognize the concern of capacity limits have focused on flow management al-
gorithms which optimize ground delay, route selection, and airborne holding times
for individual aircraft [85]. For these approaches to work, a clear understanding of
capacity is however required.
The traditional view in the literature is that capacity is constrained by controller
workload, also sometimes called dynamic density. This dependency is visible in es-
timations of capacity, which commonly rely on fast-time computer simulations using
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models of controller workload. At times, capacity estimations are also verified by sub-
ject matter experts such as active or retired controllers [97]. In these cases, capacity
evaluation remains strongly correlated to current or past concepts of operation.
Moreover, even when attempting to create generic metrics and methodologies
which can be applied to different concepts of operation, research at EUROCONTROL
has focused on evaluating sustainable throughput for a given maximum acceptable
delay [63]. While each sector currently has an aircraft capacity limit, called the
Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP), detecting where efficiency may be degraded [48],
new and more refined surrogate metrics such as information processing load are being
developed to replace MAP and thus address capacity evaluation on a more systemic
level. Indeed, by design, MAP is not meant to be a measure of airspace capacity, but
rather a performance threshold which could indicate excessive traffic density.
In fact, research has shown that capacity and delay are not solely related to
traffic demand. Weather causes approximatively 70% of delays in the NAS and is
therefore considered by some to be the most fundamental limiting factor of airspace
capacity [84]. A more accurate measure of capacity of a sector would therefore need
to be modeled as an uncertain predictive measure which depends on the complexity of
the traffic flows and on weather conditions [163]. Stochastic models have been used to
model weather uncertainty. These models can be overlayed onto airspace geometries
to define analytical, probabilistic expressions of weather constraints that limit access
to the sector and reduce the available navigation space [104].
While the modeling and definition of capacity has taken several paths, its use is
consistent in the literature. A multitude of possible optimization solutions remain
solely focused on designing airspace around capacity improvements. Capacity im-
provements have been sought through solutions such as flexible traffic management,
coupled traffic and weather prediction, and improved situational awareness between
agents in the NAS [84]. Simulations have suggested that planning actions in the
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airspace should aim to replicate well-structured queuing models [162]. Airspace plan-
ning optimizations have proposed fuel-optimal flight plans satisfying workload, safety,
and equity constraints which guarantee that controller workload in each sector is held
under a permissible limit, that any potential conflicts are routinely resolvable, and
that the various airlines derive equitable levels of benefits [151].
Yet in all of these approaches, the perspective is always that of designing airspace
around capacity improvements, with taskload seen as a fixed constraint. Compre-
hensive models of the NAS which define it as a multi-path, steady-state network
of queues conclude that its maximum capacity is the sum of the maximum airport
operational rates constrained by taskload limitations [33]. Likewise, proposed resec-
torization solutions resort to geometric partition optimization and model taskload as
problem constraints [10].
2.2 Challenge of including taskload and safety in airspace
design
To accomplish the goals of NextGen and SESAR, control cost and inherent safety need
to be accounted for in the design stage. This approach implies a break in perspective
from traditional practices. Conventionally, capacity has been the declared objective
of airspace design, with safety and taskload considered as imperative constraints on
operations, procedures, and technologies. A distinction will be made in Section 3.1.1
between taskload - understood to be related to human intervention - and control cost
- a broader concept which includes human and automated interventions.
The NextGen concept involves an operational paradigm shift from a fixed airspace
structure to a fluid airspace able to cope with increasing demand and to withstand
severe perturbations with minimal degradation [45]. Capacity improvements are the
economic motivator for the NextGen program, as well as for SESAR. However, capac-
ity improvements can be viewed as trade-offs with the safety and control cost inherent
to the design. When viewed collectively as design objectives, airspace designs may be
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identified that improve all of inherent safety, control cost, and capacity, rather than
viewing safety and control cost as constraints on capacity.
Airspace design must therefore change its dominant paradigm and fully include
control cost and inherent safety as objective functions. A systematic design process
considers trade-offs between performance levels, life cycle costs, operational benefits,
and technical and functional integration risks, driven by performance objectives such
as capacity, safety, affordability and environmental impact, has long been advocated
and called for [55] but has yet to be implemented.
Indeed, the importance of the safety-driven and human-centered design has been
duly noted in the literature. Proponents have argued that integrating new compo-
nents into an airspace management system should account for these two principles,
allowing for critical properties to be designed into the system from the start [95].
When these perspectives are ignored, after-the-fact safety assessment leads to it-
erative model adjustment instead of redesign. Likewise technology-centric airspace
design that assumes the human cannot handle the control cost of the airspace, yet
leaves the human supervising automation, may lead to accidents easily blamed on
pilot or controller error when in fact the mistakes lie with the designer [117].
A proposed solution in the direction of designing airspace according to additional
objectives has been the full resectorization of the airspace in order to optimize taskload
allocation between sectors [172]. This approach, however, falls short of suggesting
the more fundamental redesign. Compared to current practices, it is only a slight
improvement in that it takes a more global view instead of the localized, center-based
perspective.
This thesis advocates the reconsideration of control cost and inherent safety as
principal objectives integrated in the early process of airspace design alongside ca-
pacity. The empirical applications in Chapters 3 and 4 show how these factors can
be evaluated using lean models and result in conclusions about airspace design. The
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specific motivation of this work is to move away from treating safety and control cost
as constraints, but rather providing a way to control them in the airspace design
phase. This motivation leads directly into the two applications shown in Chapters 3
and 4.
2.3 Proposed concept of operation
2.3.1 Present organization
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is the service ensuring the movement of aircraft in the
airspace. ATM can be broken down based on the forecast and action time horizon into
two components: Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Traffic Flow Management (TFM).
ATC is the tactical safety separation service. ATC look-ahead time horizon when
interacting with a given aircraft is usually under 15 minutes. TFM is the strategic
traffic allocation service which manages flows and allocates routes to demand. TFM
look-ahead time horizon ranges from an hour to as much as months.
To fulfill its function, ATM has three essential capabilities: Communication, Nav-
igation and Surveillance (CNS). Communication occurs between aircraft, pilots, and
air traffic controllers. Navigation is the capability of aircraft to follow a given trajec-
tory, with prescribed precision. Surveillance is the capability of air traffic controllers
to monitor the position of the aircraft relative to each other, and relative to terrain
or restricted areas.
In the United States, the National Airspace System (NAS) is partitioned in twenty-
four Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). Twenty of these cover the conti-
nental U.S., two additional centers handle traffic over and around Hawaii and Alaska,
and two more are responsible for the territories of Puerto Rico and Guam. Each of
these centers is further subdivided into different sectors, as shown in Figure 3 [1].
The sectors are staffed by different sets of controllers and use distinct radio frequen-
cies for communication with the aircraft. As aircraft traverse the NAS and are in
13
different stages of their flight from takeoff to landing, pilots must switch frequencies
and communicate to tower, terminal radar control TRACON, several ARTCCs, again
TRACON, and tower.
Figure 3: NAS centers [1]
The boundaries are seldom redefined other than merging adjacent sectors during
off-peak hours such as late-night shifts. Resectorization only occurs in the current
system at the traffic managers’ initiatives, and is performed in a way aimed at balanc-
ing controller workload and increasing the level of perceived traffic structure. Sector
shapes thus usually account for major traffic flows. The purpose of current airspace
management is primarily to avoid controller overload. Each sector has an aircraft
capacity limit, called the Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP), notifying when such over-
load might be possible [48].
The primary building blocks of the current airspace are sectors, routes, fixes, and
different airspace classes [48]. Class A airspace is the high-altitude enroute airspace
between 18,000 feet (flight level 180) and 60,000 feet (FL 600) and requires filing of
an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Class B airspace is the airspace below
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10,000 feet around the busiest airports, and is designed on a case by case basis. Class
C airspace is beneath 4,000 feet around medium-sized airports with a control tower
and radar. Class D airspace is beneath 2,500 feet around airports with a control
tower. Class E airspace is all controlled airspace that is not one of the other classes
between A-D. It is used by aircraft transiting between the terminal and high altitude
enroute airspace, and makes up most of the current low altitude en-route airspace.
Class G airspace is uncontrolled airspace. Figure 4 shows the classes of airspace.
Airspace-at-a-Glance
















Figure 4: Airspace classes [3]
Two types of routes comprise the network on which aircraft travel: jet routes (J)
in Class A airspace and victor (V) routes in Class E airspace. The route network
connects ground-based navigational aids (Navaids) and at times forces aircraft to
move in a zigzag fashion. When compared to wind-optimal or great circle routes, the
total length of all victor routes currently in use is 9.3% greater, and that of the 303
jet routes is 4.7% greater [59].
Current ATM infrastructure is becoming obsolete, and two major programs are
being developed to overhaul this aging system. The programs are Next Generation
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Air Transportation System (NextGen) - introduced by the Joint Planning and De-
velopment Office (JPDO) in the USA [77] - and Single European Sky ATM Research
(SESAR) - introduced by SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU) [149] in the EU. With
these programs, ATM moves toward leveraging new technologies such as digital com-
munication, satellite navigation, and other improvements which reduce inefficiencies.
2.3.2 Transition from centralization to decentralization
Current instrument flight rules (IFR) operations are centralized. Traffic data is
gathered at a central point via radar or radio, and conflict detection and resolu-
tion (CD&R) is performed at the centralized point by a human air traffic controller,
who then transmits instructions by radio to the entire sector, verbally specifying
which aircraft they are destined for. Aircraft are expected to comply unless safety
concerns arise. Some suggested future concepts of operation have sought to main-
tain this organization whilst replacing the controller with ground-based automation
which centrally coordinates navigation in the airspace and broadcasts clearances via
datalink [38]. These centralized concepts rely mainly on accurate trajectory predic-
tion and following.
Conversely, many speculative decentralized concepts of operation have revolved
around the ideal of free flight [37], in which aircraft have the authority to select
their own trajectories, subject to some constraints to ensure separation. Under this
concept of operation, on-board CD&R was considered to be key. A copious amount
of research inspired by free flight has therefore been carried out since the 1990s on the
topic of CD&R [87]. In current operations, a decentralized approach is only found in
VFR operations where pilots are responsible for avoiding other aircraft.
Current regulations notwithstanding, nearly twenty years after it was first men-
tioned [119] true free flight continues to seem a far-term concept at best. Of more
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relevance to this thesis is the literature concerned with the near- to mid-term time-
line, grounded to some extent in existing or foreseeable practices. Significant research
surrounds future concepts of ATM with varying degrees of autonomy, where some air-
craft can fly under a centralized mode, while others fly under a decentralized mode
of control [89]. The allocation of control modes need not be fixed for an aircraft and
may dynamically vary depending on internal or external circumstances, as can the
specific function allocation between modes depending on the respective intents and
time horizons (tactical or strategic) of each task. In general, it has been accepted
that a centralized paradigm would provide more equitable and wide-ranging optimal-
ity of the airspace if complete and accurate information exists about current aircraft
locations and predictions of future position. Conversely, a decentralized paradigm is
thought to provide more individualized optimality, to distribute workload, and to be
more resilient in the face of degradation [86].
Preliminary testing of autonomous navigation scenarios showed that airborne sep-
aration could potentially be safely performed with five times the typical traffic density
compared to today’s NAS [28]. However, some form of supervisory control of separa-
tion by controllers remains the most viable concept for separation assurance and colli-
sion avoidance [36]. Along those lines, NASA has proposed three major concepts that
progressively introduce autonomy into operation, transitioning from current practices
without abruptly removing the human controller from the system.
Autonomous Flight Management (AFM) is a concept which supports demand-
scalable capacity, user flexibility and autonomy [169]. It is envisioned AFM opera-
tions would operate in a shared airspace with the existing ground-controlled flight
operations. The concept is supported by Airborne Separation Assistance System
(ASAS) technologies which typically allow the aircraft to manage certain compo-
nents of its 4-D trajectory within the set of operational constraints negotiated with
the Air Navigation Service Provider. To certify participant aircraft to rigorous and
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appropriate performance standards, the existing Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) construct could be extended into a dynamic standard [168].
Function allocation concepts have been compared in terms of separation assur-
ance in high density airspace [170], with homogeneous airborne and ground-based ap-
proaches. Where comparisons were possible, no substantial differences in performance
or operator acceptance were observed. Mean schedule conformance and flight path
deviation were considered adequate for both approaches. Conflict detection warning
times and resolution times were mostly adequate, but certain conflict situations were
detected too late to be resolved in a timely manner, which led in both experiments
to situations compromising safety and where workload was rated as unacceptable.
Another NASA concept in its initial deployment stages is the Distributed Air/Ground
Traffic Management concept (DAG-TM), also enabled by ASAS. ASAS systems en-
able pilots to resolve near-term conflicts even with lower separation minima (3 NM
instead of 5 NM). With prototype systems, an improvement was found in threat
proximity and risk mitigation when pilots followed tactical guidance cues provided
by ASAS, although the compliance rate remained relatively low [8]. Performance and
reported acceptance of the use of procedures relying on airborne separation assistance
and trajectory management tools was also tested [29]. A lognormal distribution was
found to be a good fit for the pilot response delay. Additionally, it was determined
that the total pilot response times were well within ranges verified during prior stress
tests and no safety impact in terms of loss of separation was observed. Recommenda-
tions for the interface design of an integrated weather and traffic information cockpit
display that would improve compliance have been formulated [26].
The feasibility of the DAG-TM concept was tested by means of a human-in-the-
loop study of autonomous aircraft operations in a highly constrained airspace [83].
Results showed that reducing the lateral separation standard had no adverse effect
on the pilot ability to meet traffic flow management constraints, and had the positive
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effect of decreasing the incidence of cascading conflicts. In near-term conflicts, the
pilots’ ability to mitigate risk depended more on their compliance with the tactical
resolution guidance than on the size of the conflict detection zone. The use of prior-
ity rules improved the pilots’ ability to conform to airspace constraints but was not
critical for ensuring separation in over-constrained scenarios. Among the conclusions
applicable to cockpit traffic advisory systems, it was found that broadcasting the
commanded trajectory (i.e. the actual 4-D command law from the avionics) rather
than the proposed but unachievable FMS flight plan, would reduce unnecessary ma-
neuvering and the adverse interactions between aircraft resulting from false conflict
alerts.
A third concept related to AFM and DAG-TM is Cooperative ATM (Co-ATM)
which was formalized to describe the first stages of introducing autonomy into ATM
operations. Co-ATM envisions coexisting present-day and future semi-autonomous
operations [128], and distinguishes between sector controllers who control conven-
tional aircraft along predictable flight paths and area controllers who coordinate
strategic trajectory changes with the flight crews of equipped aircraft. The airspace
is shared between the two, and coordination occurs via data link. Area controllers
rely on automation support for conflict detection and resolution and for traffic flow
management. The automation performs routine tasks such as hand-offs. Properly
equipped aircraft may be cleared to operate at different levels of autonomy, including
self-separation. Initial testing of this concept has shown potential for increasing en-
route capacity [130], however the research has yet to reach a maturity level sufficient
to generalize its predictions.
Finally, other research introduces a more theoretical distributed approach to man-
age traffic complexity while preserving aircraft trajectory flexibility. The underlying
hypothesis of this work is that autonomously preserving trajectory flexibility is suf-
ficient to naturally avoid excessive traffic complexity on an aggregated scale [66].
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Furthermore, an assumption is that individual trajectory flexibility can be increased
by collaboratively minimizing trajectory constraints, which in turn does not jeopar-
dize the intended air traffic management objectives.
2.4 Envisioned airspace paradigm
This thesis allows for two navigation modes that may co-exist: autonomous flows
in which aircraft self-separate, and conventional routes which rely on direct air traf-
fic control guidance. For autonomous flows, a human or automated controller must
intervene to return aircraft that have reached the tolerance bounds of their 4-D tra-
jectories. Assuming formally correct automation is responsible for establishing 4-D
trajectories, imprecision still arises from the unavoidable discrepancy between an al-
gorithmic model and the physical world, a phenomenon known as total system error
(TSE). For controlled routes, a controller must intervene to correct trajectories and
prevent a loss of minimal separation.
While other sources of uncertainty may exist in the full-scale system - such as
equipment reliability and human controller awareness - the aforementioned variabili-
ties are inherent to even idealized operational settings and provide baseline estimates.
Over time, as many aircraft traverse the sector, the cumulative effect of several
improbable events may ultimately require the controller or automation to intervene
and realign an aircraft with its intended 4-D trajectory. The volatility of trajectory
deviations is a measure of variability for the oversight activity the controller must
provide.
Conversely, in conventional airspace, controllers must themselves perform conflict
detection and resolution (CD&R) work and directly intervene to communicate tra-
jectory changes. The variability of arrival schedules into the sector, and that of the
occurrence of intersecting trajectories, translates into a measure of variability for the
CD&R activity, that the controller must provide.
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The following sub-sections describe the implication of this paradigm for the airspace,
inherent safety, and control cost.
2.4.1 Airspace attributes
The airspace refers to an abstract construct defined by route geometry, autonomy
allocation, and traffic levels. The model of airspace parametrized by the aforemen-
tioned items has been previously used in the literature [72]. The geographical extent
of the airspace in this thesis corresponds to approximately an airspace sector, roughly
150 nautical miles across. The thesis assumes no resectorization, and does not inves-
tigate redesigning the boundaries specifically. The research also does not attempt a
comprehensive mathematical formulation of the airspace as a dynamical system.
Autonomy defines an aircraft’s capability, authority and responsibility for trajec-
tory determination. Routing decisions are of two types: strategic route definition and
tactical trajectory determination. This thesis only focuses on the strategic level. Air-
craft are authorized to determine their trajectories through a limited network of flows.
The network is a model for routes in the airspace, segregated between autonomous
and directly controlled routes. The degree of autonomy, defined by the size of the au-
tonomous subnetwork within the whole sector network, is one of the factors defining
an airspace structure. In this research, two navigation modes coexist: autonomous
flows which function by self-separating aircraft navigation, and conventional routes
which are reliant on direct air traffic control guidance.
With changing operational paradigms requiring 4-D navigation, such as flow cor-
ridors, the nature of air traffic patterns and the complexity of traffic will shift. Dif-
ferent sources of uncertainty and variability may emerge, such as the imprecision of
autonomous trajectory determination [125], the occurrence of scheduling errors [9],
or the evolving traffic distribution between points of entry and exit [58]. Relative to
current operations, controllers will thus be required to interact with the airspace in
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new ways.
The disparate effects of various airspace configurations are yet to be understood
on an aggregated scale. Control cost and inherent safety descriptors of the airspace
that are constructed in this thesis emerge from the granular level of aircraft-by-aircraft
behavior. The aircraft granular behavior is translated into a more macroscopic system
view through a network model of routes.
2.4.2 Inherent safety
Inherent safety refers in this thesis to a route structure which is insensitive to pre-
dictable errors and deviations, regarding aircraft separation and operation. A conflict
is a loss of minimal separation between aircraft, as defined by FAA regulations. Typ-
ically, minimal separation is 3-5 nautical miles depending on the phase of flight.
The traditional view of airspace design sees safety as a constraint on allowable
states. Safety has been and continues to be a foremost concern of air traffic, with
a clear metric in its symptoms: Airspace is generally considered to be safe if no
conflicts and collisions occur. Yet safety has an unclear definition in its roots. Is it a
matter of system reliability [94]? An emergent property [150]? Because of the unclear
characterization, safety-driven design in the airspace only exists for IFR terminal
approach procedures, through the FAA TERPS [41] and ICAO PANS-OPS [68].
For that reason, an adequate metric must be defined. A first-order measure of
safety is the physical distance between aircraft. But separation is a static measure
that falls short of giving the full picture. Indeed, how separation evolves is affected by
traffic density, trajectory geometry, and trajectory imprecision or risk of deviations
from the prescribed intent and nominal conditions. Figure 5 shows two circumstance
with the same separation. Intuitively, however, it is clear that the diverging aircraft
present safer conditions than the converging aircraft. A more complete assessment
of safety requires a complex and eluding construct meant to describe a dynamic
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situation.
(a) Diverging aircraft (b) Converging aircraft
Figure 5: Aircraft separation
In the literature many possible surrogates such as hockey pucks, ovaloids, trumpet
shapes have been used in order to characterize safe trajectories [87]. Figure 6 shows
three types of models: nominal, worst case, and probabilistic [51, 87]. In the nom-
inal case, perfect information and trajectory accuracy are assumed. Aircraft avoid
conflict as long as they do not directly cross each other’s paths closer than the min-
imum separation distance. In the worst case, it is assumed that an aircraft could
deviate anywhere within their turning radius at any given time. Therefore, conflicts
are avoided if other aircraft do not come within a range less than the minimum sepa-
ration distance, over a wide range of bearings. In the probabilistic case, position and
trajectory uncertainties are modeled by random variables, and conflict risk becomes
a fuzzy measure determined by a probability density [51].
The traditional description of airspace safety, static or probabilistic, is intent-
based. Separation in the airspace is assured if aircraft follow their prescribed routes
(with some level of accuracy). This thesis seeks to find routes that are inherently
safe in terms of being robust to potential deviations without trying to assess the
probabilities of those deviations. Therefore, another quantifiable surrogate for safety
is needed. In this thesis, the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
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(a) Nominal (b) Worst Case (c) Probabilistic
Figure 6: Trajectory safety models
logic is used as such a surrogate.
TCAS logic evaluates conflicts in state-based conditions instead of the more tra-
ditional intent-based view. A set of trajectories are safe - and so is ultimately the
airspace - if following nominal trajectories does not result in TCAS advisories being
triggered. Figure 7 shows navigation conditions which are safe in an intent-based
perspective (if aircraft follow their routes and turn), but not in a state-based view
(their present velocity vector leads to a collision).
The use of TCAS logic thus provides a path toward ensuring airspace resilience
by testing the intent-based safety of nominal conditions with the state-based safety of
dynamical operation. Routes can therefore be designed in a way such that no collisions
or near misses could occur within a sensible interval (30 seconds to a minute). In
previous studies where routes were redesigned for new types of operations, such as
for continuous descent arrivals (CDA), designers used nominal conditions with large
tolerance bounds to ensure separation [139].
Using TCAS as a proxy of safety allows the designer to anticipate and proactively
avoid the propagation of cascading deviations: a TCAS advisory means that following
an initial deviation, two aircraft are now in unsafe circumstances and must coordi-
nate a maneuver. In cases of high-density traffic, these two maneuvers may trigger
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Figure 7: State-based and intent-based safety
secondary conflicts.
This thesis considers that precise route planning and flow scheduling under nom-
inal conditions would improve separation assurance and thus reduce the need for
controller interventions. However, this thesis asserts that safety is not only about
being able to follow routes with extreme precision, even if such routes are nominally
safe according to instantaneous static separation assurances. The thesis assumes that
these nominal standards are reliably defined at a broader spatial and temporal reso-
lution, which is outside the scope of the thesis. The reduction of controller-requested
conflict avoidance maneuvers is a consequence of nominal separation assurance. This
thesis instead focuses on degraded conditions. Indeed, for many reasons ranging from
human error to equipment failure, nominal conditions can degrade [51] and routings
or clearances can be breached. It is in that case that the TCAS-based description
of safety is relevant. In terms of the allowable separation provided by TCAS, it has
been shown that spacing using this system is primarily limited by aircraft dynamic
response rather than uncertainty of data [142]. Therefore, resorting to TCAS as a
surrogate to distinguish dangerous from benign trajectories makes sense.
2.4.3 Control cost
The control cost is a construct which identifies the requirements necessary to control
a system. In this research, the evaluation of control cost pertaining to an airspace
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structure refers to the rate of required interventions by the controller or automation
to avoid degradation and maintain stability. The control cost changes when allocating
partial autonomy to some flows (allowing some aircraft to self-separate) while retain-
ing control of others (requiring ATC control as in current practices). The control cost
also changes due to increasing traffic volumes.
The traditional view of control cost has been limited to human controller taskload.
Research has studied the effect of airspace configurations and traffic patterns on
taskload. Sources of variation include traffic complexity, quality of equipment, indi-
vidual differences, and cognitive strategies [105]. In the traditional view, tasklod has
been a constraint on allowable states of airspace design.
Conversely, this thesis introduces control cost as an objective to guide airspace
design. Control cost has two sources depending on navigation modes: deviations in
autonomous airspace, and conflict resolution in controlled airspace. For autonomous
flows which function by self-separating aircraft navigation, the controller or automa-
tion must intervene to return aircraft that have reached the tolerance bounds of their
4-D trajectories. Assuming formally correct automation is responsible for establish-
ing 4-D trajectories, the imprecision comes from the unavoidable discrepancy between
an algorithmic model and the physical world, a phenomenon known as total system
error (TSE). For controlled routes which are reliant on direct air traffic control guid-
ance, a controller must intervene to correct trajectories and prevent a loss of minimal
separation. Figure 8 shows the two sources of control cost.
In autonomous space, both the human controller and automation may intervene
when aircraft deviate outside of their tolerance bounds. Centralized automation on
the ground may take on the task of detecting such deviations and send a corrective
message to the pilot via datalink. It is however not likely to be implemented in the
near future given current regulatory environment and legacy equipage. First, the
automation that separates aircraft in the autonomous flow is located on the aircraft,
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(a) In autonomous space
(b) In controlled space
Figure 8: Sources of control cost
not on the ground. Thus the data that the onboard autonomous system is using
is actually different from the data the controller or ground-based automation sees.
Second, even in such circumstances where centralized ground automation would di-
rectly communicate with aircraft, experiments have identified controllers’ reticence at
completely giving up oversight of aircraft routing and conflict resolution [129]. Other
studies have shown that controllers’ workload increases when autonomous aircraft
deviate without signaling intent [37]. Thus, even if the automation would actually be
tasked with communication, it is likely that controller’s attention will nonetheless be
solicited. Therefore, control cost in both cases has an impact on human performance.
2.4.4 Summary and justification of the reframed problem
A wide range of alternative concepts of operation are possible and have been con-
sidered in the literature - ranging from ground-based automated centralization to
full free flight [11, 13]. This thesis examines the specific paradigm defined by partial
allocation of routes between autonomous 4-D flows and controlled space.
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The merit of this concept is its grounding in a real-world setting. In any sys-
tem, transitions are the hardest to manage. The concept of operations is a plausible
evolution of air traffic operations, perhaps even a necessary step toward operations
which deliver on the promises of NextGen or SESAR. To some extent, modern opera-
tions such as continuous descent approaches (CDA) and RNP already delegate some
level of autonomy to the aircraft [7]. Yet while technological advances and modern
capabilities are considerable, operational changes lag behind.
The work is placed within a defined concept of operations, focused around enroute
traffic. The concept of operations involves segregated autonomous and controlled re-
gions of the airspace, distinguished by separate subnetworks. From a control stand-
point, the concept can be referred to as mixed centralized-decentralized control. From
a human factors perspective, the concept involves a mixed active-passive role of the
controller.
The objective of this work is to design airspace for inherent safety and control
cost. This chapter reviewed how safety and control cost have been used descriptively.
The approach taken in the thesis uses them prescriptively, and expands the approach
of airspace design centered on capacity improvements. Since NextGen and SESAR
state economic performance goals, capacity is one objective which continues to be
relevant, but inherent safety and control cost must also be accounted for in design
process for several reasons.
First, additional metrics such as the aforementioned ones would not easily specified
if determined after-the-fact. Instead, the concept and methods introduced in the
thesis allow an explicit trade-off. Furthermore, focusing airspace design on capacity
improvements restricts stakeholders’ perspectives. A limited perspective in turn has
repercussions on the types of technologies which are considered of interest, and leads
to a poorly-defined technology-centric design. Other limitations can also result from a
narrow focus on capacity improvements, such as limited types of operational changes
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are envisioned and considered. As a result, limited paths become apparent in the
system evolution process, rendering the task of reaching performance goals stated by
the NextGen concept of operations ever more arduous.
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CHAPTER III
MODEL AND APPLICATION OF CONTROL COST
This chapter demonstrates airspace design centered on control cost, based on research
published by the author [121,122]. This chapter introduces tools to clarify the control
cost of allocating partial autonomy to some flows while retaining control of others,
and also the expected control cost due to increasing traffic volumes. Control cost is
measured by the resulting requirements needed to maintain the part-autonomous and
part-controlled structure, i.e. the rate of required interventions, by the controller or
automation, that ensure safety of the airspace.
A lean model of control cost is constructed in the form of a one-parameter stochas-
tic process that allows the mapping of design variables (specifically, autonomy allo-
cation) to design evaluation metrics (specifically, control cost). Lean models are
defined by four characteristics: they are compact descriptors, have forecasting abil-
ity, can guide systematic airspace design, and require low computational cost for use
online.
The research envisions two navigation modes coexisting: autonomous flows which
function by self-separating aircraft navigation, and conventional routes which are re-
liant on direct air traffic control guidance. In autonomous flows, a stochastic model
is used to estimate the probability of individual aircraft deviation away from the pre-
scribed 4-D trajectories and associated bounds. Over time, as many aircraft traverse
the sector, it is the cumulative effect of several improbable events that ultimately
may require a controller to intervene and realign an aircraft with its intended 4-D
trajectory. The volatility of trajectory deviations is a measure of variability for the
oversight activity the controller must provide.
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Conversely, in conventional airspace, controllers must themselves perform con-
flict detection and resolution (CD&R) work and directly intervene to communicate
trajectory changes. The variability of arrival schedules into the sector and of the
occurrence of intersecting trajectories translates into a measure of variability for the
CD&R activity the controller must provide.
This chapter presents the result of a Monte Carlo simulation method, which incor-
porates stochastic models of both autonomous and controlled routes. A diagram of
the airspace simulation architecture constructed for this research is shown in Figure
9
Figure 9: Airspace simulator diagram
An overview of the state of the art for topics relevant to the work is given in Section
3.1. In Section 3.2.1, we present the navigation model used to characterize the aircraft
behavior along the autonomous flows, as well as reasonable numerical values of the
model parameters taken from the literature. Section 3.2.2 provides an overview of the
other simulator models used in this work, such as the the autonomous flow scheduling
model, the conflict detection and resolution CD&R simulation, and the traffic model
used on controlled routes. This network structure is used to partition the airspace
between autonomous and directed traffic. In Section 3.3, we provide the results of the
Monte Carlo simulation. Insights from the model are discussed in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 concludes the chapter by suggesting optimal policies for autonomy allocation in the
airspace and discussing some of the insights obtained from this simulation, including
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a proposed Poisson process as the lean model for control cost. The Poisson process is
found to be the maximum likelihood model. The formulas and theoretical derivations
used in this chapter are detailed in Appendix A.
3.1 Background
This section reviews the literature and state of the art relevant for the control cost
application. After a discussion of the traditional view of control cost, the concept
of flow corridors is presented, a discussion on aircraft navigation models and conflict
detection and resolution algorithms is carried out. The section ends with a review of
air traffic flow modeling.
3.1.1 Traditional view of control cost
In most research meant to quantify the requirements of a human controller inter-
acting with the airspace system, taskload and workload have often been used inter-
changeably. In the commonly accepted definition, workload is a mental construct
which cannot be directly observed [78]. The construct of controller workload has
been extensively studied [35], and measurements related to workload are grouped
into three types: objective performance measures for primary or secondary tasks,
subjective measures, and physiological measures. Very diverse approaches have been
tried [40, 136]: subjective self-rated questionnaires adapted from NASA TLX [56],
psycho-physiological measures, contextual, environmental and behavioral studies, ac-
tion and event counts, or complexity modeling [105]. Other models of taskload re-
quirements include aggregated temporal cost by tasks involved in controlling traf-
fic [146]. Yet the literature to date has not provided a model that is compact, accu-
rate, and general.
This thesis is restricted to a simple and easily observable metric well suited to
the scope of this research: control cost. Control cost can be manifested as controller
taskload or automation interventions. In both cases, control cost is defined as the rate
32
of required interventions that ensure safety of the airspace. We recognize that control
cost thus defined is only a subset of aggregated taskload relating to all controller
activities, and also a subset of the construct of workload [5]. Early in airspace design,
however, only control cost can be estimated.
It is known that taskload is related to interactions with the airspace and control
strategies [143]. Yet the research concerning the stochastic modeling of controller
interaction contains significant gaps: older research has shown that subjective conflict
occurrence as perceived by controllers approximately adheres to a Poisson distribution
[34]; the influence of air traffic controllers on the aircraft separation had been modeled
as a Gaussian noise which has led to the expression of constraints expected to improve
throughput [73].
Similarly, upper bounds on feasible resolution rates at flow intersections appear
in [159]. However, each of these approaches only focuses on single, specific details
of a controller’s interaction with air traffic. Many approaches have attempted to
characterize traffic effect on workload on a more aggregate level. Some examples
include deriving capacity from notions of airspace structure [72] or through metrics
of complexity such as dynamic density [91].
Research has also identified a need to understand the effect of changing airspace
configurations and traffic patterns on the taskload of air traffic controllers. Four
main factors have been shown to influence taskload: the primary factor is air traf-
fic complexity, an ill-defined construct. Mediating factors are quality of equipment,
individual differences, and cognitive strategies [105]. Complexity refers to a descrip-
tion of air traffic patterns and sector characteristics and has produced much research
seeking to best quantify it. A well-known metric to that end is dynamic density [153].
Quality of equipment considers the accuracy of radar systems or the usability of user
displays and interfaces. Individual differences account for anxiety levels, personality,
age, and experience. Cognitive strategies are the approaches used by controller to
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mentally process the requirements of handling traffic.
Cognitive strategies have been extensively studied [65], and it has long been known
that controllers rely on underlying airspace structure to reduce the cognitive complex-
ity of their tasks. Airspace structures are believed to influence controllers’ mental
models in a way that simplifies planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating
tactical situations, as well as maintaining situational awareness [141]. Yet little re-
search attempts to apply taskload models in a proactive manner to design airspace.
The traditional perspective is that of a causal dependency going from airspace de-
sign to its consequence on control cost. The possible feedback which would promote
airspace design with taskload in mind is not addressed.
Taskload is related to airspace configurations through estimations of sector capac-
ity that usually call on controller taskload models in fast-time computer simulations.
A review has identified two major models in use, the Reorganized ATC mathematical
simulator (RAMS) and the Total Airspace Airport Modeller (TAAM). RAMS is used
in the UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Sweden. TAAM is used in Germany, Switzer-
land, France, Canada, Japan and the US. These models are discrete event simulation
models which consider a number of defined events such as entry into and exit from
the sector, conflict detection, and conflict resolution. A different approach is the Sec-
tor Design and Analysis Tool (SDAT) developed by the FAA. SDAT is an analytical
model of controller workload built from historical radar tracking and radio communi-
cation data, without consideration of conflicts [97]. Yet in both analytic, stochastic
approaches, as well as more qualitative, operational perspectives, taskload has been
modeled as a constraint in airspace design solutions instead of being modeled as an
objective to guide airspace developments.
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3.1.2 Flow corridors
The flow corridor concept introduced in the NextGen concept of operations [77] de-
scribes aircraft following high-precision 4-D-metered trajectories and managing their
in-trail separation. Similarly, the SESAR goal [149] of trajectory-based operations
(TBO) relies on 4-D trajectories with traffic flows that are deconflicted before flight
in order to reduce tactical interventions during flight. The TBO concept is oper-
ationalized as RNP trajectories enabled by equipment certified to operate within
probabilistic tolerance bounds [69]. In the future, the standards are expected to
converge on more uniformly stringent requirements, which will impact the oversight
requirements [43].
Under future operations, flow corridors will rely on self-separation, a capabil-
ity achieved by fully leveraging Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B) [44]. ADS-B equipment allows for the construction of high-density, high-altitude
enroute corridors. Relative to conventional controlled airspace, flow corridors allow
multiple parallel lanes of traffic, require self-separation by means of advanced avion-
ics supporting 4-D trajectories [107], and use dynamic activation rules to add or
remove corridor structures with changing demand [173]. Preliminary testing [28] of
autonomous navigation showed that airborne separation could potentially be safely
performed with up to five times current traffic volumes. The validity of these concepts
and results is examined in this research.
3.1.3 Aircraft navigation models
Much of the trajectory variability research invokes position uncertainty. The classic
characterization of position uncertainty models the error as normally distributed with
a time-wise linear standard deviation of the along-track error and a constant standard
deviation of the cross-track error [115]. This model has been expanded to represent
aircraft oscillations around their prescribed trajectories using Wiener processes [60],
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and to include dynamics where both position and velocity uncertainty are modeled by
superposed Wiener processes [15]. Computational simulation have included hybrid-
state Markov processes with switching coefficients and or Petri nets [17, 18]. By in-
troducing uncertainty in the position and trajectory evolution, research showed that
the minimum relative displacement between conflicting aircraft can follow a normal
distribution, and that the minimum distance between them has a folded normal distri-
bution [71]. While the Wiener process, or Brownian motion, is a good approximation
over short time intervals, longer time frames may lead to divergence and inconsis-
tent results. To better model behavior over longer intervals, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
model - also called mean-reverting - introduced in [122] can be applied.
3.1.4 Conflict detection and resolution algorithms
Probabilistic models of trajectory variability have focused on understanding the oc-
currence of conflicts. ICAO has defined the acceptable levels of fatal accident risk
at one mid-air collision, or physical incrossing, per 109 flight hours [67]. The classic
model used to predict risk values for air traffic management, known as the Reich
collision model, was developed in 1964 [137]. Over the last twenty years, the Reich
model has been generalized to express collision risk based on first hitting times of
Markov processes [6, 19].
The application of conflict detection research is usually the design of resolution
algorithms, with varying approaches to state information, state propagation, detec-
tion threshold, resolution method, maneuvering dimensions, and multiple conflict
handling [87]. Various approaches include time-inhomogeneous Markov chains to de-
scribe the relative position between two aircraft [62], spatially correlated wind pertur-
bations [61], and decentralized algorithms and used reachability analysis [165] to solve
the resulting stochastic differential equations through potential fields methods [127]
or through switching diffusion models approximated by Markov chains [126]. In more
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recent research, the conflict resolution algorithms have used mixed integer program-
ming [116]. This work builds on the fuel-optimal mixed integer linear program with
parametric workload constraints presented in [161].
3.1.5 Air traffic flow models
Despite all the aforementioned research, little is available on stochastic traffic flow
management and route structure design. Poisson process models for traffic flows have
been postulated in the past, and research has developed management strategies by
postulating such models of Poisson process flows [106, 162]. Furthermore, through
simulations and flight tests, feasible flow throughput bounds have been shown to be
approximatively Erlang-distributed [139, 140]. However, evidence concerning incon-
sistent variance levels indicates limitations of this model [147]. This work uses the
Poisson model but also tests the sensitivity to variations in the distribution.
The Poisson flow model has nevertheless raised some doubts, as conflicts at route
intersections were shown to be expressible as a sum of correlated random variables
with a variance larger than that obtained by the Poisson flow model [147]. Research
has also shown that the circadian variations of the aircraft arrival process do not
correspond to a homogeneous Poisson process, but that the arrivals can nevertheless
be modeled as a non-homogeneous process over that time frame [145].
3.2 Method
This section details the method used in the control cost demonstration. The differ-
ent models are introduced, starting with the autonomous navigation model which is
an original development of this research. The section continues with other simula-
tion modules which were developed elsewhere but integrated for the purpose of this
research.
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3.2.1 Autonomous navigation model
A diagram of the autonomous aircraft navigation module called by the simulator is
shown in Figure 10. A detailed explanation for each step of the process follows in
this section.
Figure 10: Autonomous navigation module diagram
3.2.1.1 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic aircraft model
This section explains the model used to simulate aircraft autonomous navigation. The
model attempts to capture the uncertainty with which aircraft follow trajectories,
also known as Total System Error (TSE). The ICAO Performance-based Navigation
(PBN) manual [69] defines TSE using Equation (1) as the root sum of squares of
Path Definition Error (PDE), Flight Technical Error (FTE), and Navigation System
Error (NSE), for which it assumes independent, zero-mean Gaussian distributions.
PDE occurs when the path defined in the RNAV system does not correspond to the
path expected to be flown over the ground, and is assumed negligible due to the
multiple pilot checks and read-backs that prevent erroneous waypoint programming;
FTE relates to the air crew or autopilot’s ability to follow the defined path or track;
NSE refers to the difference between the aircraft’s estimated position and actual
position. Further ICAO assumptions are that FTE is an ergodic stochastic process
within a given flight control mode but that nothing can be said of the NSE due to
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sensor errors, relative position from navaids, and inertial errors.
TSE2 = FTE2 + NSE2 ( + PDE2 ) (1)
To convert the static description of error into a dynamic model that can be in-
tegrated to the simulation based on an explicit stochastic differential equation, TSE
oscillations around a deterministic trajectory are modeled as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
mean reverting process. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a stationary Gaussian
process with bounded variance and is governed by the stochastic differential equation
shown in Equation (2).
The mean reverting model is meant to reproduce the behavior of inaccurate navi-
gation (modeled in the volatility and the Brownian oscillation σdWt), with a control-
ling cockpit (pilot and guidance equipment jointly functioning as a complex socio-
technical system [65]). The cockpit attempts to prevent major deviations (modeled
in the elasticity κ) from the deterministic trajectory (the mean µ, also referred to as
process drift). To our knowledge, this model was first introduced in [122], but has
not thus far been used in a complex air traffic simulation.
dXt = κ(µ−Xt)dt+ σdWt (2)
Here µ is the mean vector, κ the elasticity matrix, σ the volatility matrix, and Wt
a Wiener process (standard Brownian motion). Xt represents the actual position of
the aircraft relative to its prescribed position in the 4-D trajectory. This corresponds
to a change of variable X = P4D − V t, where P4D is the time parametrization of the
4-D trajectory, V is the velocity vector, and t is time.
The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model is an order increase in complexity over the Brow-
nian model, but more applicable to the longer times it takes an aircraft to cross a
sector, circa 20 minutes. Under the Brownian model for longer characteristic times,
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the position of the aircraft would be an indifferent diffusion. This makes the model un-
realistic, while under the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model the elasticity term more strongly
bounds the probability of higher deviations. For this model, the expected total delay
and spatial deviation summed over the trajectory length is 0. Nevertheless, the am-
plitude and uncertainty of local occurrences is critical to study as these will prompt
a controller intervention. In other words, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process provides a
more realistic model of aircraft adherence to a prescribed trajectory for longer time
frames, and is better applicable in the frame of analyzing controller oversight roles.
Mathematically, the future position of a Brownian realization has a normal distri-
bution with variance that grows linearly with time. As variance grows, the normal
distributions flattens and widens, leading the realization of the process to almost
surely hit every point in space given enough time. While the Brownian model is sat-
isfactory for short-time analyses of fleeting aircraft encounters [60], its use for longer
times - on the order of magnitude of an aircraft crossing a sector, circa 20 minutes -
is more difficult to justify.
This research seeks to obtain results on the aggregated effect through a Monte
Carlo simulation where the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck elementary process is repeatedly used
for autonomous aircraft within a full-scale simulator of air traffic within a sector. Some
closed-form expressions exist which can help verify the result, such as the conditional
probability of an aircraft reaching the allowed precision bounds (specified in the RNP
standard) over a defined time frame. These derivations are carried out in Appendix
A.
For autonomous flows, the control cost is calculated as the number of interven-
tions needed to prevent an aircraft from trespassing the allowed precision bounds.
The oscillation dimensions of an aircraft are calculated longitudinally, laterally, and
vertically.
Furthermore, an important assumption has been made regarding the probability
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Table 1: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck aircraft model parameters
Lateral Vertical Longitudinal
κ 3.492 min−1 1.841 min−1 2.1662 min−1
µ 2.79 · 10−2 NM 8.034 ft 9.965 · 10−2 NM
σ 7.27 · 10−2 NM 8.683 ft 0.2774 NM
of pilot reaction. PBN requires that the airborne navigation equipment has the func-
tion of self performance monitoring and alert, such as receiver autonomous integrity
monitoring (RAIM) [69], which enables the crew to monitor the TSE. In that case,
should the pilot become aware of the deviation and react in time, we assume the con-
troller would still be required to provide a certain amount of control cost. Control cost
would be manifested either through a redundant intervention, a confirmation of pilot
correction, or simply as the observation of the aircraft and readiness to intervene.
However this control cost should provide a reasonable estimate on the differential
control cost composed by different roles. To justify this we assume the volatility of
the process captures all shortcomings in the capabilities of the cockpit - understood
as a socio-technical system [65].
3.2.1.2 Model calibration
To calibrate the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process model to match navigation un-
certainty, the Gaussian and Markovian properties of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
are used to formulate the log-likelihood function [158]. The log-likelihood function
is explicitly given in Appendix A and can be maximized numerically. The resulting
parameters µ, κ, σ of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model used in the simulation - for spa-
tial units expressed in nautical miles (lateral and longitudinal) or feet (vertical) and
temporal units expressed in minutes - are shown in Table 1.
Due to insufficient experimental data required to calibrate the stochastic model,
a random number generator was used to generate fictitious samples of error tracking
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data. These samples conserve the statistical properties noted in the literature, and
as such provide a good baseline representation of navigation error.
3.2.1.3 Generated empirical navigation data
A Johnson SU “unbounded system” [76] is identified in the literature [96] as the best
fit probability density function for the lateral FTE of a Boeing 747, under RNP-0.3
sensitivity 1.
A note on the chosen level of accuracy: RNP 0.3 is the typical navigation ac-
curacy during straight final approach, inside terminal airspace, where any aircraft
will not only change horizontal positions continuously, but also lower its altitude si-
multaneously. In enroute flight, RNP-5 or RNP-2 may be more relevant in terms of
requirements, while the actual FTE will depend on factors such as flight control laws
and fight operating modes, leg types, flight conditions and aircraft performance. To
stay away from arbitrary corrections of the parameter values, we choose to rely on the
available data and restrict assumptions to suppose that aircraft in 4-D flows would fly
using their highest available accuracy level. Section 3.3.2 addresses this assumption
by testing under double FTE variance.
Equations (3) and (4) represent the analytical expressions of the probability den-
sity function for the FTE model used in this paper. The Johnson SU distribution is a
transformation of the standard normal distribution, and is better adapted to model
the observed heavy-tailed skewed data. If XSNV is a standard normal variate then
its transformed XSU is of the type given in Equation (3), with γ, δ, λ and ξ different
scaling parameters for the family of distributions. The transformed density function
is shown in Equation (4).
1RNP is a type of performance-based navigation that defines the probabilistic tolerance bounds
for a trajectory between two points in space. Thus, RNP-0.3 sensitivity means the cross-track error
will remain less or equal to the RNP level (0.3 NM in this case) with 95% probability, and has a
probability of less than 0.001% to exceed twice the RNP level (0.6 NM in this case)
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λ 0.0443 NM 7.2907 ft 0.2145 NM
ξ -0.01567 NM 10.0362 ft -0.0401 NM


























The required Johnson SU parameters γ, δ, λ, ξ can be identified by numerically
solving the Winterbon equations which are 24th order algebraic equations [171]. The
equations rely on statistical moments to fit a corresponding probability density func-
tion. We in turn use the parametrized density function to define a random number
generator. The random number generator uses the parameter values in Table 2 to
generate samples that are used in the calibration of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
which in turn drives the autonomous navigation module of the simulator, as shown
in Figure 10. The transformed standard normal quartile values shown in Table 3 can
then be deduced from the resulting cumulative density function.
Due to the practical difficulty in obtaining experimental FTE recordings, the nu-
merical calibration of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model (2) for the aircraft was performed
based on simulated data. In conformance to the findings of Levy et al., the Johnson
unbound system SU given at (3) was used to generate fictitious FTE data (see Figure
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Table 3: Johnson SU quartiles
Lateral (NM) Vertical (ft) Longitudinal (NM)
Q1 −6.98 · 10−2 1.147 -0.302
Q2 −3.89 · 10−2 6.215 -0.152
Q3 −1.46 · 10−2 10.2 −3.52 · 10−2
Q4 9.98 · 10−3 14.27 8.42 · 10−2
11). The properly parametrized random number generator provided data adhering
to the moments in Table 4, with a 1-minute sampling time step which corresponds
to the sampling rate of trajectory data used in the CD&R module elsewhere in the
simulator.











































































Figure 11: Simulated FTE histograms and theoretical density functions
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3.2.1.4 Statistical parameters
Some literature exists which can help quantify the various statistical parameters rep-
resentative of navigation error. While [96] has significant information relevant to
this research, little other numerical and statistical parameters for navigation error
can be found in the literature, which mostly deals with small aircraft and general
aviation [64,112,166].
Related work is focused on precision approaches, often in the context of continuous
descent arrivals (CDA) [23,30,53], although some work on performance benefits from
improved glass cockpits (synthetic vision) presents data on observed flight technical
performance and error [148]. In one study, especially relevant to the present paper,
prototype flight management capabilities under 4-D trajectories use temporal RNP
baseline tolerance ranges [7]. Among older research, studies focused on GPS per-
formance provide accuracy information for automated landing procedures [25], and
RNAV navigation [113], while a noisy closed loop model of cross-track error during
precision approach is found in [164].
Current ICAO standards for Precision-based Navigation demand that the Total
System Error remain equal to or less than the required navigation accuracy (i.e.
the RNP level) with 95% probability, and that the TSE has a probability of less
than 10−5 in exceeding twice the required navigation accuracy. Typically, the 10−5
requirement provides a greater constraint: assuming a normally distributed cross-
track TSE, this bounds the standard deviation to be σ ≤ 0.45·RNP, while the 95%
requirement sets a bound at σ ≤ 0.51·RNP. These however are statistical constraints
relying on unbiased sampling, which is difficult to achieve in practice. The only
dynamic constraint taken into account by onboard equipment is an alert if there is a
greater than 10−7 probability that the error exceed twice the RNP level within one
hour. A full stochastic process characterization such as the one introduced in this
paper is more rigorous and allows for a better assessment of risk.
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Table 4: FTE statistical moments [96]
Moment Lateral Vertical Longitudinal
µ1 -0.028 NM 8 ft -0.1 NM
µ2 = σ










Indeed, according to [96] assuming a static normal distribution of the FTE signif-
icantly underestimates the risk of transgressing a containment area. Because of the
heavy-tailed occurrences, the ICAO regulatory 10−5 probability extreme value bound-
ary is a hundred times more likely to be hit under a Johnson SU distribution (i.e.
with a 10−3 probability) than under a normal distribution. The first four moments
(mean, variance, relative skewness, relative kurtosis) used to identify the parameters
of the Johnson SU system are shown in Table 4.
3.2.2 Other simulation models
As shown in Figure 9, the simulation relies on four different modules that describe air
traffic, which are linked together by a model of the airspace. Taskload calculation for
autonomous flows uses the autonomous navigation model introduced previously. The
autonomous navigation model, however, depicts individual aircraft. The taskload for
one or multiple flows aggregates such probabilities from individual aircraft by using
a flow scheduling model. The other type of airspace is controlled airspace. In con-
trolled airspace, a controller is expected to perform conflict detection and resolution
activities, represented by the CD&R model. CD&R is applied to non-autonomous
traffic, provided by the controlled traffic model. The relative allocation of the two
types of airspace inputs into the simulation and is governed by the airspace network
model.
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3.2.2.1 Flow scheduling model
A diagram of the autonomous flow scheduling module called by the simulator is shown
in Figure 12. A detailed explanation for each step of the process follows.
Figure 12: Autonomous flow scheduling module diagram
For the autonomous flows we adopt a widely accepted model of interarrival times
distributed according to an invariant Poisson process; this is equivalent to modeling
passage times along the flow by an exponential distribution, and is a fair approxi-
mation of the system behavior over a short-time horizon (hourly time frame). The
present research performs Monte Carlo simulations to obtain the distribution of events
over a two hour period. This duration was chosen as the typical length of work unin-
terrupted by breaks encountered in operational contexts. Furthermore, that duration
allows the stationary assumptions to hold on this time scale.
Equations (5) and (6) are the analytical expression of the flow model. If N(t)
is a cumulative count of all aircraft having entered the sector, then the probability
distribution for the number of aircraft entering a flow between times t and t + τ is
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given by (5) and the probability density for the values of interarrival times x is given
by (6).




fλ(x) = λ exp
−λx, x ≥ 0 (6)
Most rigorously, the distribution of velocities inside a flow is also a random vari-
able [144]. In this simulation, the schedule is matched with randomized aircraft
information based on historical data (see Section 3.2.2.3). The velocities are chosen
as constant to represent optimal average speeds of each aircraft type, and present
some small variation around 480 knots. Obviously such a model neglects weather
effects.
We justify this assumption in the context of 4-D trajectories by constraints added
to the along-track performance of the aircraft, which is not the case in current proce-
dures. For a more realistic case, the flow would need to be modeled as a birth-death
process with two different Poisson processes, on entry and on exit from the controlled
region. This adds some difficulty to the problem, without making it prohibitive.
The statistical study of the typical traffic entering Cleveland center conducted
in [145] provides mean aircraft spacing between 50 and 200 NM for the ten busiest
flows in the sector, and an hourly Poisson intensity parameter λcenter between 10 and
100 (aircraft per hour) depending on time of day, with values averaging 80 for most
of the busy times (6 AM to 8 PM EST). For the ten busiest flows in the center, the
velocity and spacing values provide average intensity parameters λflow from 10 to 2.5
(aircraft per hour). A reasonable estimate for the time an aircraft spends in a sector
is 20 minutes.
For each of the flows in the simulation, its Poisson process parameter is set to
reflect historical traffic densities along the routes it replaces. The traffic load is also
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controlled as an input through a traffic multiplier variable which allows the evaluation
of various future scenarios. The flow scheduling module integrates data from the
sector airspace network model presented in Section 3.2.2.4.
3.2.2.2 Conflict detection and resolution model
A diagram of the CD&R module called by the simulator is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13: CD&R module diagram
The module provides conflict detection and resolution by solving a mixed-integer
linear program following the formulation presented in [161]. The optimization mini-
mizes fuel costs, with constraints for separation and by accounting for controller work-
load limitations through a penalty function. In line with the nomenclature of [161],
the present simulation uses a CRP − λ = 10−8 parameter. This parameter is the La-
grange multiplier used to include workload constraints in the optimization. We refer
to the paper in question for further details. While fuel burn costs as a function of
airspeed typically result in nonlinear problems and nonconvex spaces, special ordered
sets of type two (SOS2) are used to partition the solution space and obtain a tight
linear convex approximation.
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Each MILP is solved to deconflict a traffic scenario. The traffic scenario is pro-
duced by the traffic module presented in Section 3.2.2.3. Controller taskload is conse-
quently deduced from the scenario solution as the number of required speed changes
given to aircraft present in the airspace. Validation of this model is difficult, since
in practice distinguishing which controller interventions are due to a conflict resolu-
tion and which are not is very hard to measure on real traffic. Specifically, it is not
obvious at any given time which maneuvers are objectively necessary to avoid con-
flict, which are more subjective preventive measures, and at which time horizon these
occur respectively. Results from the model appear nonetheless to match experimen-
tal measures. The activity assessment of en route air traffic control has shown that
controllers request an average of 34 trajectory modifications per hour when handling
traffic over a typical sector [103]. This number is very close to the results produced
by the model (around 38 interventions required per hour for conflict resolution on a
fully controlled network).
The computing time for this module varies greatly on the traffic volume and route
network complexity (see Section 3.2.2.4 for an explanation of the airspace network
model). At present-day traffic volume and over a subset of all routes in the sector, the
algorithm runs in near real-time. A normal-traffic scenario is solved in 0.2 seconds on
a quad-core, 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon E5420 CPU with 8 GB RAM. With higher traffic load
(10X) and more available routes (nearing 100% of the network), processing times can
increase to around 1 minute 45 seconds. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that
such traffic volumes are totally unrealistic under any circumstances, since forecasts
of traffic growth are capped at an 85% increase over the next 20 years [47].
3.2.2.3 Controlled traffic model
A diagram of the controlled traffic module called by the simulator to generate traffic
scenarios is shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Controlled traffic module diagram
The traffic scenario referred to in Section 3.2.2.2 is extrapolated from histori-
cal trajectories stored as Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) data. The
database contains one-minute radar tracking along with aircraft type and filed flight-
plan, as well as detailed temporal information on the flight.
As with the autonomous flows presented in Section 3.2.2.1, the traffic load of
the scenario is considered a simulation input, controlled through a traffic multiplier
variable. The routes where traffic is simulated are selected by the sector airspace
network model which allocates autonomous and controlled routes (see Section 3.2.2.4).
For the given controlled routes, a search is performed in the ETMS database to
extract all concerned aircraft. The method uses the k-nearest neighbor search algo-
rithm to identify aircraft. Aircraft are then randomly extracted from this reference
pool until the desired traffic levels are reached. For realism, some further spatial vari-
ability is created by allowing a Gaussian process N (µ = 0, σ = 5NM) to act on the
entry and exit locations. Thus no two identical aircraft trajectories are used in the
traffic scenario. Equivalently, the linear program presented in Section 3.2.2.2 is not
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degenerate (there are no zeros among the objective function coefficients) and thus the
simplex method used for solving is guaranteed to be finite and reach optimality. As
before with the autonomous flows in Section 3.2.2.1, the schedule of sector entry for
controlled routes is also generated by a Poisson process where the mean parameter
reflects traffic intensity. A more detailed explanation on the traffic scenarios can be
found in Section 5.2, where this example is used to justify the benefits in airspace
design that can be derived from data mining.
3.2.2.4 Airspace network model
A methodology to define flows by clustering aircraft trajectories has been demon-
strated in [52]. Radar tracking data is first subject to Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) which reduces its dimensionality. Flow clustering is then performed on the
processed data using the DBSCAN algorithm [39].
This approach was applied to the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS)
data for Cleveland center (labeled ZOB). ZOB was selected because of its significance
within the continental United States. A majority of flights originating in New York
or Chicago airports traverse this center, as do many coast-to-coast routes. The en-
route traffic is therefore comprised of multiple high volume routes. This makes ZOB
center well suited for the purpose of the present research to evaluate the allocation
of autonomous and controlled airspace in enroute sectors.
While trajectory clusters are a step toward dimensionality reduction, the proba-
bilistic nature of the concept in terms of spatial extent does not sufficiently describe a
system of flow corridors. Further building from the clustered flows, a network graph
representing the airspace was introduced in [99]. Nodes of the network are locations
where aircraft may switch flows. The edges of the oriented network are defined based
on origin and destination. For the purpose of this research, a smaller scale network
was extracted, presented in Figure 15. The network represents routes restricted to
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only one sector, ZOB49, with new entry - exit points identified and positioned on
the sector boundary. The use of the network for only one sector is meant to better
capture a single controller’s workspace.
















Figure 15: Route network limited to sector ZOB49
Figure 16 shows a density plot of trajectories in the center as well as the complete
network graph.
The simulator uses an autonomy ratio to extract and redefine subnetworks as
either autonomous or controlled. The ratio refers to number of flows, ordered from
busiest to least busy. Figure 17 show different ratios of extracted subnetworks. A 25%
autonomy ratio means 25% of the busiest flows in the sector are defined to support
4-D self-separating navigation. These flows make up an autonomous subnetwork.
It is important to note that traffic distribution is heaviliy skewed toward the most
important flows: Figure 18 shows that the 25% busiest flows carry around 85% of the
traffic in the sector.
The extraction of subnetworks from the initial sector network, as represented in
Figure 17, is performed so as to favor straight paths and ensure entry-exit connectivity.
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Figure 16: Trajectory density plot and graph representation of Cleveland center [99]
This means that from any node in the autonomous subnetwork, the majority of
aircraft will be able to exit the sector without leaving autonomous flows, and without
performing extreme heading changes. These properties are essential to deliver desired
benefits in terms of time gained and/or fuel burned [77]. On those flows, taskload
is created by aircraft exceeding their alloted precision bounds. The other 75% of
flows in the network comprise the controlled subnetwork. The controlled subnetwork
relies on traditional ATC, with controller guidance to ensure conflict detection and
resolution.
















(a) 25% of network
















(b) 50% of network
Figure 17: Extracted subnetworks
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Traffic distribution by flows
Figure 18: Traffic distribution in sector
The subnetworks are respectively used by the autonomous flows and controlled
routes models (see Figure 9).
3.3 Results
This section presents the results of the control cost simulation. After presenting the
predicted control costs, a sensitivity analysis is performed to test the effect of the
model assumptions. The section continues with a discussion of the application to
airspace design, and ends with a proposed stochastic model for control cost.
3.3.1 Control cost predicted by simulation
In autonomous airspace, control cost is calculated as the number of interventions
needed to prevent an aircraft from trespassing the allowed precision bounds. In
controlled airspace, control cost is calculated as the number of speed changes that
were required to prevent a conflict and were given to aircraft in the airspace.
A Monte Carlo simulation for sector ZOB49 (Cleveland center) is performed. Two
independent variables are of interest: percent autonomy allocations over the network
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model (ranging from 1% to 100% of number of flows, starting with the busiest) and
traffic level (1 or 2 times present-day traffic, maintaining proportions between flows).
For each autonomy ratio and traffic volume, the control cost is sampled multiple times
to generate a probability distribution. Each test generates traffic over a 2 hour period
and calculates the resulting control cost. For each autonomy/traffic parameter value
pair, 5,000 samples were generated on the autonomous subnetwork and 3,000 samples
on the controlled subnetwork.
Figure 19 shows the mean control cost values - with 95% confidence intervals - for
the autonomous and controlled subnetworks. As the autonomy ratio increases, the
autonomous subnetwork increases and the controlled subnetwork becomes smaller.
Consequently, the main source of control cost moves from conflict detection and res-
olution (on the controlled subnetwork) to deviation supervision (on the autonomous
subnetwork). Conversely, with less autonomy, the controlled subnetwork is more com-
plex, and thus more control cost is required to deconflict possible trajectories from
more different routes. As might be expected, a higher level of traffic increases the
control cost, but the relation is not linear.
Figure 20 shows the mean duration between interventions for the autonomous and
controlled subnetworks. As the autonomy ratio increases, the task rate periodicity
becomes smaller for the autonomous subnetwork, and conversely becomes larger for
the controlled subnetwork.
3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
Two types of sensitivity analyses were performed on the autonomous subnetwork. The
effect of flow scheduling models is shown by comparing Poisson to bounded uniform
distributions. The Poisson model (with exponential interarrivals) is described in
Section 3.2.2.1. The bounded uniform model is a random process where for a flow with
mean interarrival time µ, each observation is randomly drawn from the equiprobable
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. The effect of navigation accuracy is shown by comparing the error
described in Section 3.2.1 with an FTE model where variance is doubled, but RNP
standard is maintained.
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Figure 20: Mean task rate required for different autonomy allocations and traffic
levels
Figure 21 shows the sensitivity of control cost (number of interventions per two
hours shift) to autonomy ratio, flow scheduling model, and aircraft accuracy (FTE).
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Poisson with double FTE
(a) Control cost






























Poisson with double FTE
(b) Taskrate
Figure 21: Sensitivity analysis
It can be seen that FTE has a significant impact, while autonomy ratio and flow
scheduling model are not as important. Using uniformly distributed flows instead of
Poisson flows has a slight effect by increasing mean control cost. It has been shown
in Figure 19 that traffic volume also has an increasing effect, less than proportional
however.
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3.4 Airspace design insights
3.4.1 Discussion
The effect of autonomy ratio and traffic volume are shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20.
The fastest increase in control cost is due to the top 25% busiest flows - containing
over 80 % of the traffic in the sector. Adding more or less routes to the autonomous
subnetwork continues to increase control cost at a slower rate. This is because most
of the traffic is concentrated on the busiest flows, as shown in Figure 18. The average
control cost confirms that with low requirements for controller intervention, allocat-
ing airspace autonomy to most of the high-traffic routes is not likely to pose safety
concerns.
In the case of controlled routes, however, control cost mean and standard deviation
grow exponentially as the number of controlled flows increases (i.e. the autonomy
ratio decreases). Despite much lower traffic volumes, on aggregate, in the controlled
subnetwork, as more flows are added, controllers must account for aircraft trajectories
coming from different directions. Deconflicting more variable trajectories is the source
of both a higher average number of interventions, as well as higher variance.
Increasing traffic volumes impact control cost resulting from both the autonomous
and the controlled network. With increasing traffic numbers a dual effect is reflected
in control cost, as both the mean and the standard deviation increase. The required
control cost is dependent on four main drivers: total number of aircraft in the sector,
number of aircraft with autonomous versus controlled navigation, aircraft naviga-
tion accuracy on the autonomous subnetwork, and route complexity with points of
intersection on the controlled subnetwork.
The average number of interventions increases proportionally with traffic on the
controlled subnetwork, which is not true on the autonomous subnetwork. On the
controlled routes variance also grows proportionally, which does not happen on the
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autonomous network. Such a result is significant when considering future traffic de-
mands, as a higher variance in control cost signals more uncertainty and irregularity
in event occurrences. Therefore, while capacity limits may be extended and aver-
age control cost requirements may remain tolerable, considerable effort will have to
be directed at reducing risk through mitigating the induced variability by ensuring
more consistent and regular operations. High control cost variance is a symptom of
unpredictable and potentially unsafe airspace.
When comparing the effects of traffic volume and autonomy ratio, we come to
four conclusions. First, the autonomy ratio affects control cost from the controlled
subnetwork in an exponential manner, but has a more linear effect on control cost from
the autonomous subnetwork. Second, traffic volume affects control cost from both
subnetworks in an approximately linear fashion. On the controlled subnetwork the
effect is proportional, while on the autonomous subnetwork the multiplying effect is
less than one. The linearity is true both in terms of mean but also regarding standard
deviation. This indicates consistently higher control cost, but also larger variability
which is even more costly in cognitive resources. Third, reducing the autonomy ratio
has a less drastic effect on the controlled network than increasing the traffic. Thus,
some level of autonomy can serve as a safeguard against heavy control cost due to
traffic volume increases. By going from 2.5% to 0% autonomy, which translates in
a doubling of total controlled traffic (albeit over more routes), control cost on the
controlled subnetwork increases slightly from 30 to 35. However, doubling the traffic
volumes on each of the controlled routes takes control cost from 35 to 105. Fourth,
while autonomy is not necessary at current traffic levels, with increasing traffic a
suitably chosen level of autonomy can provide relief to the controller.
An interesting application of these results is on the right policy for autonomous
routing implementation. By designing autonomy allocation starting with the more
heavily circulated flows, it has been shown here that safe control cost numbers can
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be maintained at double today’s traffic. Furthermore, adding some autonomy (cov-
ering 20% or less of most circulated flows) can have a net positive effect of reducing
controller control cost and allowing him or her to cope with traffic volumes much
higer than encountered today. By directly controlling less circulated routes, where
the aggregate traffic is only a fraction of the overall traffic, the controller would have
more time to directly focus on those aircraft requiring unusual routing conditions,
without being overwhelmed. This results holds even with increasing traffic, as much
as double today’s volume. The downside is poor robustness in terms of directly con-
trolled routes. With an increase in the complexity of controlled routes, control cost
increases exponentially.
The other option is to start by providing autonomy to less circulated routes.
Two benefits are apparent. First, less density means more slack for error, as the
aircraft navigation imprecision is not likely to lead to unsafe situations. Second, the
controller would primarily focus his or her attention on the high density routes, where
direct control can be maintained during the transition. But since these routes already
maintain a sense of spatial order, the effect of increasing traffic on control cost would
not be as severe.
The relative effect of traffic volume on different flows is a determining factor for
both controlled and autonomous routes. In the case of autonomous routes where the
controller provides oversight, it is the traffic density that determines control cost; in
the case of controlled routes traffic volume is important, but the geometric multiplicity
of possible entry and exit points in the sector has a significant impact.
By transforming the multiple, highly variable low-traffic routes into autonomous
4-D flows, the aggregate controller control cost coming from solving complex conflicts
is reduced. Thus, such a policy would allow throughput increase, free up controller
cognitive resources, and provide an opportunity for a seamless transition from cur-
rent operations. Yet the main benefits of autonomous 4D scheduling - not requiring
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routine separation assurance from the controller in high density traffic - would not be
capitalized on.
The question of sensitivity of these results to model parameters must also be raised
before final conclusions may be drawn. The sensitivity analysis in Figure 21 points
to two important points. First, the flow scheduling model (Poisson or uniform) only
has a marginal effect. Second, navigation accuracy as modeled by FTE plays a very
significant role. Very similar results were obtained for task rate (interval between
interventions).
In this sensitivity analysis lies an essential conclusion for autonomous navigation:
the validation of high precision in aircraft navigation is the most significant driver
of real-world applicability of aircraft autonomy. Without precise navigation (low
FTE), autonomy allocation will result in drastic control cost requirements due to the
frequent breach of safety bounds. A caveat to this statement is the assumptions made
throughout the paper that autonomous flow deconfliction will continue to be feasible
from a computing standpoint. In terms of scheduling, uniformly distributed flows will
contribute to reduce variance even if they do not reduce the average required control
cost.
3.4.2 Proposed model
Based on the results of the simulation, models can be fitted to the control cost and
rate over the autonomous subnetwork. Figure 22 shows probability functions for these
two variables. A maximum likelihood estimation is carried out to identify the best
model. The four plots in Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the goodness of fit of several
distributions to control cost data, for two traffic levels (1X and 2X), and for the two
different subnetworks (controlled and autonomous). Each plot estimates the fit for
different autonomy ratios in the network. The y-axis values are the signal-to-noise
ratios of the fit. Signal-to-noise ratio for an estimated parameter is defined as the
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maximum likelihood value of the parameter divided by the standard deviation of the
estimation (which is also half the spread of the 95% confidence interval). Therefore,
the higher the signal-to-noise ratio, the better the fit.
For distributions where several characteristic parameters must be estimated, the
distribution signal-to-noise ratio is taken as the mean of the multiple parameter signal-
to-noise ratios. An example of a distribution characterized by two parameters is the
normal distribution, defined by its mean and standard distribution. For distributions
where only one characteristic parameter must be estimated, the signal-to-noise ratio
of that parameter is the signal-to-noise ratio of the distribution. An example of a
distribution characterized by one parameter is the Poisson distribution, defined by
only its mean.
The full list of distributions tested is given in Table 5. Figure 23 and Figure 24
identify the Poisson process to be the best fit for control cost in all four cases. As
can be expected, the signal-to-noise ratio improves when there are more data samples
which can be used by the maximum likelihood estimator. This explains why the
signal-to-noise ratio for control cost over the autonomous subnetwork increases when
the autonomy ratio increases, and why the signal-to-noise ratio over the controlled
subnetwork increases when the autonomy ratio decreases.
With control cost fitted to a Poisson process, by definition task rate is fitted
to an exponential process. If N(t) is a cumulative count of interventions required
of the controller up to a time t, then the probability distribution for control cost
between times t and t+τ is given by Equation (7) and the probability density for task
rate (times between interventions) is given by Equation (8). The relation between
parameter values and autonomy ratio or traffic multiplier is highly nonlinear, as
represented in Figure 25 for taskload, and Figure 26 for task rate.
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Figure 22: Control cost and task rate probabilities required for different autonomy
allocations in the airspace at current traffic level









, x ≥ 0 (8)66











































(a) Control cost on controlled subnetwork













































(b) Control cost on autonomous subnetwork
Figure 23: Maximum likelihood estimation goodness of fit for control cost, 1X traffic
The main insight from the Poisson model is the dimensionality reduction sufficient
of describing the system. Complex interactions between many different stochastic
components, shown in Figure 10, can be simplified to a single parameter description.
The fact that a Poisson process characterizes the system is not surprising. Poisson
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(a) Control cost on controlled subnetwork









































(b) Control cost on autonomous subnetwork
Figure 24: Maximum likelihood estimation goodness of fit for control cost, 2X traffic
processes are also referred to as obeying the law of small numbersor rare events:
these are improbable events that have many opportunities to happen. Moreover,
the occurrence is quasi-independent of time since last event. For both the model of
aircraft deviation or conflict occurrence, these properties hold on the system level.
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Figure 25: Control cost: Poisson process parameter fit
Therefore, the use of a Poisson process could also have been postulated with some
conceptual backing.
The Poisson model adheres to the definition of a lean model of control cost. Lean
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Figure 26: Task rate: Exponential process parameter fit
models are defined by four characteristics. First, a lean model is a compact descriptor -
the Poisson process is a well-known stochastic process defined by a single parameter.
Second, the lean model has forecasting ability - the use of a Poisson model in a
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simulation provides expected control cost results. Third, the lean model can guide
systematic airspace design - the Poisson process allows the mapping of design variables
(specifically, autonomy allocation) to design evaluation metrics (specifically, control
cost). Fourth, the lean model requires low computational cost for use online - a
random number generator can be used to replicate the characteristics of the Poisson
model.
3.5 Summary
This research presents a simulator infrastructure to identify the effect of navigation
autonomy on airspace risk and control control cost through Monte Carlo methods.
By balancing directly controlled routes with autonomous 4-D trajectory flows in the
airspace, the control cost required to maintain system performance and safety is
drastically impacted.
An air traffic network model based on [99] is used as a baseline for allocating the
two types of airspace, autonomous and controlled, within one sector managed by a
controller. The autonomy ratio of the accessible network and the traffic multiplier
which inflates aircraft numbers are the two parameters used to define several scenarios.
For the autonomous flows, fundamental stochastic models of the aircraft navi-
gation error (an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process) and of the flow scheduling (a Poisson
process) are introduced, along with reasonable numerical values of the model parame-
ters. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck aircraft model is calibrated - by a maximum likelihood
estimation - to match simulated data, obtained from a random number generator
defined by a Johnson unbounded system SU . The use of simulated data to calibrate
the model is a requirement in the absence of sufficient experimental data; the random
number generator provides fictitious data consistent with statistical characteristics
of the aircraft motion. The Poisson flow model uses intensity parameters to meter
each flow schedule consistently with traffic information extracted from the existing
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network model. The control cost from overseeing autonomous flows is calculated as
the number of interventions required to reset aircraft on the verge of trespassing the
allowed imprecision bounds of their 4-D trajectories.
For the controlled airspace, fuel-optimal trajectories of individual aircraft are cal-
culated and the traffic scenario is solved using a mixed integer linear program based
on [161]. The linear program maintains minimal safety separation between aircraft
at all times while minimizing deviations from their optimal trajectories. The control
cost is calculated as the required total number of maneuvers aircraft must perform.
Historical radar data is used to seed the simulation and generate aircraft trajectory
samples according to the traffic multiplier and autonomy ratio inputs.
This research shows several things: First, the autonomy ratio affects control cost
from the controlled subnetwork in an exponential manner, but has an almost linear
effect on control cost from the autonomous subnetwork. Second, traffic volume affects
control cost from both subnetworks in approximately linear fashion, both in terms
of mean but also regarding standard deviation. While the higher expected control
cost remains manageable, the higher standard deviation indicates a large variability.
Variability is more costly in cognitive terms, and signals an unpredictable and po-
tentially unsafe system. Third, reducing the autonomy ratio has a less drastic effect
on the controlled network than increasing the traffic. Thus, some level of autonomy
can serve as a safeguard against heavy control cost due to traffic volume increases.
Fourth, the flow scheduling model only has marginal effect. Fifth, the autonomous
navigation error plays a very significant role, as identified by the sensitivity analysis.
Sixth, a Poisson process can be used to model control cost resulting from both the
autonomous and control subnetworks.
An application for these results is policy design of autonomy allocation in the
airspace. Furthermore, the research implies that future efforts must be directed at
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further reducing navigation errors and route complexity, and ensuring a smoothly-
operating airspace through robust self-deconflicting algorithms.
Some additional factors which will need to be considered in future research include
interactions between the two types of navigation. Thus, in the case of navigation
downgrading, additional control cost would be caused by aircraft exiting autonomous
flows to join the controlled subnetwork, or vice-versa. This different source of control




MODEL AND APPLICATION OF INHERENT SAFETY
This chapter demonstrates airspace design centered on inherent safety and is based
on research published by the author [123]. The method is to identify inherent char-
acteristics of route geometries that may lead to the occurrence of TCAS advisories,
and use that information to redesign airspace. Two steps are therefore required.
First, identifying which trajectory geometries lead to TCAS advisories, and second,
extrapolating that information to inform systemic airspace design.
A lean model of inherent safety is constructed in the form of multidimensional
convex polyhedra that allow the mapping of design variables (specifically, route ge-
ometry) to design evaluation metrics (specifically, inherent safety). Lean models are
defined by four characteristics: they are compact descriptors, have forecasting abil-
ity, can guide systematic airspace design, and require low computational cost for use
online.
Short of being able to experiment with real trajectories, the research demonstrates
a novel method to identify trajectories that generate collision avoidance advisories.
The TCAS advisory issued to a pilot is highly sensitive to the trajectory of an intruder
aircraft relative to the ownship flown by the pilot. Further, the complexity of the
TCAS logic requires a novel method for mapping trajectories to the range of possible
advisories. These challenges are overcome by applying a Rapidly-exploring Random
Tree (RRT) algorithm in large-scale fast-time simulations to establish the mapping
between the space of relative trajectories and TCAS advisories.
The trajectory definition and guidance used in the simulator are presented in
Section 4.2. For the purpose of generalizability, the intruder trajectories are defined
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in a frame of reference relative to the ownship. Section 4.3 elaborates on the RRT
method used to search trajectories creating the desired TCAS advisories, explains the
methodology behind scenario development, and validates the accuracy of the RRT
method through experimental testing.
The RRT method therefore accurately predicts unsafe trajectories. By identifying
unsafe trajectories and relating them to flow geometries, informed decisions can be
made in route design. Section 4.4 presents the application to route design. Trajecto-
ries are clustered, analyzed, and a compact descriptor (a multidimensional polyhedra)
is created, which can then be used to define route properties.
4.1 Background
This section presents a review of the literature relevant to the safety application.
The traditional view of safety is explained, and two main themes are then evoked: a
presentation of TCAS and human-in-the-loop interactions with TCAS.
4.1.1 Traditional view of safety
Defining what exactly is meant by the safety of airspace is not an easy problem. Fault
tree analysis has been proposed as a comprehensive way to evaluate air traffic safety.
Fault trees are used in system reliability and certification for analyzing hazards and
their underlying causes [94]. To construct a fault tree, a failure or an error is first
identified. An expert then establishes possible causes which make up the branches of
the tree.
While this method allows the verification of equipment reliability, reliability does
not necessarily imply safety. Reliability is an adequate measure of safety for sys-
tems that are inherently dangerous and must be regulated, such as nuclear plants.
For complex systems where equipment must provide a positive contribution to fulfill
a purpose, which is the case of ATM handling traffic, reliable but poorly designed
equipment may cause an operationally unsafe situation [50]. Studies have mentioned
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circumstances where air traffic safety is emergent and issues may arise due to complex
and unexpected interactions between components, even when no failure occurs [16].
Approaches to modeling emergent systemic risks mainly rely on agent-based simula-
tions [131,154].
Air traffic safety is usually understood to mean a lack of conflicts between aircraft.
Conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) research has therefore had explicit the
ambition to improve the safety of air traffic. Most of this research has developed
and improved algorithms to automate CD&R [87]. Attempts have also been made to
formalize CD&R and generate provably-safe maneuvers [156]. These formal proofs
are nevertheless only true within the bounds of the postulated models.
A widely accepted model is the gaussian definition of the uncertainty with which
aircraft follow trajectories, also known as Total System Error (TSE). The ICAO
PBN manual [69] defines TSE as a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. The acceptable
probability of accident is defined by ICAO to be one mid-air collision per 109 flight
hours [67]. Thus, the separation distance is defined as a consequence of overlapping
the tails of two gaussian distributions [138], such that the joint probability respects
the safety standard. The model is important in this case, since if TSE is assumed to
be fat-tailed instead of gaussian, the same separation distance would in fact carry a
risk a hundred times greater [96]. Static constraints are defined by imposing a no-fly
hazard zone around aircraft, thus constraining allowable states.
However, as new technologies are developed and improved accuracy is enabled,
these metrics cease to make sense at a strategic level, and in a dynamic context. Cur-
rent ICAO standards for PBN demand that the TSE remain equal to or less than the
required navigation accuracy (i.e. the RNP level) with 95% probability, and that the
TSE has a probability of less than 10−5 in exceeding twice the required navigation
accuracy [69]. Typically, the 10−5 requirement provides a greater constraint. As-
suming a normally distributed cross-track TSE, properties of the normal distribution
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bound the standard deviation to be σ ≤ 0.45·RNP, while the 95% requirement sets a
bound at σ ≤ 0.51·RNP. These inequalities are independant on specific RNP values.
Therefore, risk of deviations becomes so small that probabilistic treatment is limited
to a tactical level.
At the strategic level, safety-driven airspace design has been established for ter-
minal approach patterns. The FAA Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) [41]
and the ICAO PANS-OPS [68] prescribe the criteria for the formulation, review, ap-
proval and the publishing of procedures for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations
on terminal approach and departure. TERPS and PANS-OPS criteria specify the
minimum measure of obstacle clearance that provides a satisfactory level of vertical
protection from obstructions on normal aircraft operations.
TERPS and PANS-OPS standardize the design of terminal airspace such that
a pilot of an aircraft under instrument meteorological conditions transfers from the
beginning of the initial approach to landing by means of radio, GPS, or inertial
navigation system with no assistance from air traffic control. The pilot should be
able to navigate to the airport, hold in the vicinity of the airport if required, fly
to a position from where a safe visual landing can be made, or execute a missed
approach if the visibility is insufficient to execute a safe landing. The procedures
must be defined and published so that aircraft can land even with radio failure. Yet
significant differences exist between TERPS and PANS-OPS, for example regarding
circling approaches where the assumed radius of turn and minimum obstacle clearance
are different [152].
While TERPS and PANS-OPS are a first step toward safety-driven airspace de-
sign, they only apply to terminal areas. As in the case of taskload, the literature for
enroute air traffic uses metrics of safety in a descriptive manner, without attempting
to use it proactively. Only very recently has conflict risk been proposed as a potential
metric for airspace planning and design, but thus far the conflict risk model has been
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published without its actual applications to airspace planning [111]. Metrics which
rely on conflict probability must analyze specific trajectories and maintain a tactical
focus. For airspace design, surrogates such as TCAS hazard-zones are therefore re-
quired in order to manipulate the inherent safety of a route geometry at a strategic
level.
4.1.2 Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)
This thesis characterizes the inherent safety of the airspace by TCAS advisories.
TCAS has been developed under responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) since 1981 and has been required for operation in the U.S. since 1993 [46].
TCAS is currently required on all commercial turbine-powered transport aircraft with
more than 30 passenger seats, or Maximum Takeoff Weight above 33,000 lbs; other
aircraft have also been installing it voluntarily. The system displays the location
and altitude of aircraft within a selected range and provides an alert based on time
to conflict. The initial alert is a Traffic Advisory (TA), followed by an RA when a
maneuver is required within 5 seconds [20]. TCAS has been monitored and updated
since its inception; the most recent update is TCAS II version 7.1.
The RA determines an allowable range of vertical speeds which may require verti-
cal maneuvering by the ownship aircraft, or may constrain the aircraft from increasing
or decreasing vertical speed. Furthermore, if both aircraft are equipped with TCAS,
their maneuvers are coordinated to operate in opposing climb/descend senses. Figure
27 represents the set of possible initial RAs issued by the TCAS system. Through-
out the duration of the RA, the maneuver may strengthen (increase required vertical
speed), weaken (decrease required vertical speed), or reverse (switch to opposite ver-
tical speed). Figure 28 represents the full range of possible RA.
While conflict resolution is meant to ensure separation and thus maintain the first-
order property of safety, some research has shown that typical avoidance maneuvers,
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Figure 27: Tree of possible initial TCAS RAs
when coupled to certain route geometry structure, may lead to cascading conflicts.
With only a subset of trajectory geometries guaranteed to be stable [98], the problem
of air structure degradation remains a concern. Furthermore, in some rare cases when
a conflict is not resolved, the traffic situation may degrade itself to the verge of a mid-
air collision. The ICAO has defined the acceptable levels of fatal accident risk at one
mid-air collision (physical incrossing) per 109 flight hours [67]. In that case, TCAS
is the last-resort solution to prevent a catastrophe. By understanding the relation
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Figure 28: Tree of all possible TCAS RAs
between trajectory geometry and conflict risk, better informed choices can be made
in airspace design.
4.2 Method
This section presents the algorithmic method used to construct the inherent safety
demonstration. The simulated intruder trajectory is first explained, before the map-
ping between trajectories and TCAS advisories is presented.
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4.2.1 Simulated intruder trajectory
4.2.1.1 Trajectory waypoints
The intruder aircraft dynamic model is designed for, and applied in, ATC simula-
tions [75]. Trajectories are defined by six-dimensional waypoints: three dimensions
are used to define the spatial position of the waypoint, and three dimensions are used
to define the velocity vector at that location. The definition of trajectories via way-
points implicitly creates abstractions of the trajectory space. Each waypoint adds
six dimensions to the subspace and provides a closer approximation of the span of
possible trajectories.
Figure 29 shows the trajectory implementation [24]. The intruder uses two kinds
of waypoints in its trajectory. After initialization, the intruder flies along absolute 4D
waypoints (location + time) which follow a standard terminal arrival route (STAR).
The resulting trajectory of the intruder is indistinguishable from those of surrounding
traffic. When the ownship passes a synchronization waypoint, the intruder starts
following relative 6D waypoints (with time constraints to ensure convergence). The
intruder thus adapts to the ownship’s trajectory in order to generate an RA.
As we rely on this parametrization when referring to advisories inverse images, it
is important to note that waypoints are considered in the ownship reference frame.
Such a definition allows generalization of the results. For simplicity and efficiency,
we wish to identify the lowest dimension where consistent and repeatable resolution
advisories can be obtained.
4.2.1.2 Intruder guidance
The intruder guidance must not only generate desired RAs, but also create feasible
trajectories subject to realistic flight dynamics. Among the six dimensions for each
waypoint, some dimensions take precedence where they are more important within
the TCAS logic generating RAs. For example, vertical velocity is more significant
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Figure 29: Intruder trajectory relative to the ownship in a typical scenario
than vertical position in the generation of an RA. Thus, only one trajectory solution
is available in most cases.
The guidance logic has two steps. First, a commanded trajectory is interpolated
between the given waypoints. If only one waypoint is given, then the trajectory is a
linear extrapolation with steady altitude, heading, and speed. If two or more way-
points are given, the interpolated trajectory will be piecewise parabolic between the
two waypoints. A parabola (a second order polynomial) is the simplest interpolating
solution which passes between two points and verifies specified tangency constraints,
particularly the ability to simultaneously control both position and velocity. Such a
commanded trajectory is shown in Figure 30.
Among infinitely many possible solutions, the benefit of choosing a second order
polynomial is that of relying on an explicit simple formulation which can be easily
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used with the controller in the simulated aircraft dynamics.
However, it is important to note that intruder aircraft will not effectively follow
a parabola. Rather, the parabolas will be functions that are fed as commanded
trajectories for the outer loop physical model to track. The aircraft dynamics result
from the integration of the differential equations in the aircraft model [75] and verify
realistic saturation and response limitations on achieving the commanded trajectory.
The resulting simulated dynamics issue a trajectory between prescribed waypoints,
with set velocities in those points.
Figure 30: Intruder aircraft commanded trajectory
The corresponding guidance equations are given in Table 6, and some are rep-
resented in Figure 30. The target speed VT (t) is calculated from a moving average
to avoid large oscillations in response to variations in the ownship trajectory. The
heading ψT and vertical rate żT are set such that the commanded trajectory is a
parabola. ψwp, żwp, and Vwp are the constraints given by the waypoint. dwp and cdwp
are the straight-line and the curvilinear distances to the waypoint respectively. ψdirect
is the bearing of the waypoint from the current position and heading. αi and β are
constants governing the moving-average-smoothing of the velocity.
The second step is the execution of the intruder trajectories. These trajectories
serve as commands to the aircraft dynamic model, which is subject to limitations on
aircraft performance. The resulting trajectory is thus realistic with respect to the
aircraft performance specifications, which may not achieve the full parabola.
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Table 6: Intruder commanded equations














|cdwp − Vwp(twp − t)|
αt = 0.5; αt−1 = 0.25; αt−2 = 0.15; αt−3 = 0.1
β ≈ 1.4
In effect, the saturation bounds on the states of the aircraft model prevent the
aircraft from reaching all arbitrarily chosen waypoints and from exactly tracking
the parabolas between them. While theoretically limiting, this poses no concern in
practice. While the random sampling which determines the waypoint coordinates
spreads over large bounds, using the aircraft guidance inherently provides realistic
trajectories.
The differential equations defining the aircraft dynamic model are given in Table
7 [74]. We use standard aerospace conventions for the state space vector (φ designates
roll, θ designates pitch, ψ designates yaw, T is thrust, V is the velocity and a is a
scaling parameter). The controller model and the controller saturation constraints
are also given in Table 7. The commanded controller states are zT , VT and ψT , and
are set to follow the commanded parabola. These are defined in accordance with
the waypoint constraints, as discussed previously. A diagram of the control loops is
shown in Figure 31.
The waypoints which define intruder trajectory solutions are relative to the own-
ship trajectory. Thus, the guidance module is adaptive. The intruder dynamically
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Table 7: Intruder aircraft guidance dynamics
Plant model Controller model Constraints
ẋ = V cos γ cosψ
ẏ = V cos γ sinψ




V̇ = KV (VT − V )
φ̇ = Kψ(ψT − ψ)
γ̇ = Kż(żT − ż)
żT = Kz(zT − z)
Vmin ≤ VT ≤ Vmax
|φ| ≤ φmax
|γ̇| ≤ γ̇comfort
żminT ≤ żT ≤ żmaxT
MODELS OF PILOT AND FLIGHT CONTROL
CLOSED-LOOP BEHAVIOR
As shown in Figure 1, a common and useful
representation of aircraft control identifies an inner-
loop element that tracks attitude through commands to 
aircraft control surfaces, and an outer-loop element that 
generates the attitude commands to the inner-loop
element to achieve a specified velocity and altitude.
The following sections will review the current state of 
knowledge of inner- and outer-loop control behavior.
Models of Pilot Control Behavior
The specific linkages between aircraft, inner-loop
control element and outer-loop control element shown 
in Figure 1 mimic pilot control behavior in many tasks.
Pilot outer-loop control behavior is modeled as
three outer-loop controllers.  Each controller was
developed as a model of pilot guidance behavior in 
each dimension, roll, pitch, and airspeed.  The set of
four inner-loop controllers takes in the commanded φc,
θ c and T c from the outer-loop as well as the
requirement that βc = 0 for coordinated flight.  These 
four inputs are used by the roll, pitch, thrust and yaw 
controllers to define the the commands δa, δe, δT  and δr
respectively.
This division of inner-loop and outer-loop control is 
substantiated and reinforced by pilot training and
cockpit instrumentation.  For example, during
instrument flight training pilots are taught that the focus 
of their ‘scan’ should be on their artificial horizon to 
monitor their attitude, supplemented by frequent
glances to indications of heading, speed and altitude to 
reevaluate whether they are tracking the correct attitude 
or should readjust their desired attitude and engine
settings.  This scan is supported by a standard cockpit 
design which places the artificial horizon in the center 
of the instruments, surrounded by the airspeed, heading 
indication or directional gyro, and altimeter.
Pilot Inner-Loop Control Behavior  Several
mathematical pilot models have been developed based 
on simulator and flight test data.  The main difficulty in 
modeling pilot inner loop control behavior arises from 
their ability to adapt to changes in the aircraft behavior.
A simple but effective representation of this closed-
loop behavior for a manual control task is the crossover 
model where the combined pilot and aircraft in a single 
control dimension are described by the following
transfer function near the crossover frequency by the 














DESIRED ALTITUDE, SPEED AND 
HEADING
V, h, Ψ βc, θc, φc, Tc
β, θ, φ, T δr, δe, δa, δT
Figure 1 – Generic Control Model Composed of 
Inner- and Outer-Loop Elements
where: pS  is the pilot gain, cS  is the effective gain 
of the aircraft dynamics in this control axis in the
vicinity of the crossover frequency, and eτ  is the





















and parameters in the model are adjusted to match the 
crossover model near the crossover frequency.  The 
plant model here depends on the aircraft and on any 
stability and control augmentation used in the flight 
control system.  The form of the resulting system will 
vary, but it is typically desirable to have a first order 
response of roll input to roll rate and a second order 
response of pitch control to pitch angle response.
Pilot Outer-Loop Control Behavior  Unlike inner-
loop control behavior, pilot outer-loop control behavior 
has not been found to have a consistent form across all 
pilots and across all piloting tasks.  For example, 
depending on the phase of flight and immediate
situation, a pilot may choose to use throttle to control
flight path angle (in tracking a glide-slope), vertical 
speed (in a steep climb or descent), or airspeed (in 
adjusting speed during cruise).  However, the selection 
of these outer-loop behaviors for a trained pilot is
usually rationale and therefore predictable if the proper 
contextual factors are taken into account.
Figure 31: Generic control odel [74]
adjust its trajectory to account for the ownship movement. The TCAS logic contin-
ues to output the advisory that is desir d by th experimenter in a specific scenario.
The generated solution is robust with respect to input from the human pilot on the
ownship trajectory.
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4.2.2 Mapping trajectories to resolutions
This section illustrates how RRT can be used to map intruder trajectories to the
TCAS advisories they create. The inverse mapping can then be used to identify the
relative trajectories creating each type of RA.
4.2.2.1 Inverse problem formulation
In the traditional conflict detection problem, the direct question usually asked is
“Will this specific trajectory result in a conflict?”, or, more precisely in the case of
TCAS, “Which, if any, Resolution Advisory will this specific trajectory result in?”
This characterizes the direct mapping of a trajectory onto its image in the advisory
space, T CAS : Trajectory→ Advisory.
Figure 32: Trajectory to RA direct and inverse mappings
For this research however, the question we are attempting to answer is “What
kind of trajectories result in a specific advisory being issued?” The semantics here are
essential, for the question verbalizes an inverse problem to the one mentioned above.
Abstractly, we are characterizing the inverse mapping from the advisory space back
into the trajectory space, T CAS−1 : Advisory → Trajectory. With the inverse map-
ping, the space of trajectories is partitioned according to trajectories which result in
RAs being issued. This allows for a more refined measure of safety, and distinguishes
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conflicts which result in collision avoidance maneuvers and those which do not. Figure
32 shows a representation of the direct and inverse mappings between the trajectory
space and the resolution advisory space.
The trajectory and RA spaces are extremely different in their topologies. While
the RA space is a discrete finite space (see Figure 28), the intruder trajectory space
is an infinitely-dimensional, continuous, functional space.
Through the inverse mapping method, the trajectory space can essentially be
partitioned into inverse images of the respective RAs. However, the full infinite
trajectory space is not of interest for two reasons. First, the projections of RA inverse
images not null only in a restricted subspace of the whole trajectory space. Second,
corresponding to the model of intruder guidance given in Section 4.2.1, we are only
partitioning the space of approximations of real trajectories using the least number
of waypoints sufficient to achieve desired RAs.
4.2.2.2 The curse of dimensionality
Through the inverse mapping method, the trajectory space can essentially be parti-
tioned into inverse images of the respective RAs. Even if the intruder trajectory is
defined by only a single or pair of waypoints, the dimensionality of the problem makes
a complete search intractable: 3 ·108 possibilities for a single waypoint (corresponding
to 15-20 variations in each dimension of the waypoint) become 9 · 1016 permutations
for two waypoints. These numbers are impractical in terms of the processing times
required to fully map the space. Fortunately, the full infinite trajectory space is not
of interest for two reasons. First, only trajectories from a restricted subspace can lead
to RAs. Second, corresponding to the model of intruder guidance given in Section
4.2.1, we are only using the least number of waypoints sufficient to achieve desired
RAs (two in this case).
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Thus, the RRT algorithm [92] provides a more efficient method as a a good com-
promise between an exhaustive space search and a pure random walk. Furthermore,
building a tree structure to connect the random samples adds information and pro-
vides a more meaningful description, as relations of proximity and boundary become
explicit. Most importantly, the method returns approximate results on the space par-
tition from the early stages of computation, and these results can be further refined
as desired through more computation.
4.2.2.3 Rapidly-exploring random tree algorithm
RRT is an algorithm to explore and fill an open space by randomly constructing a
tree. The tree is constructed incrementally to quickly reduce the expected distance of
a randomly-chosen point to the tree branches. In graph theory, a tree is an undirected
graph in which any two vertices (or nodes) are connected by exactly one simple path.
In other words, any connected graph without cycles is a tree. With this algorithm,
the tree is constructed in such a way that every new sample in the space is added
by connecting it to the closest sample already in the tree. The sampling is done
incrementally within certain bounds of the existing nodes. The more samples are
generated, the finer the sampling becomes and the shorter the tree edges are. This
heuristic goes a long way to accelerate the computational process by providing a
rough initial estimate, which is then improved with additional iterations.
The algorithm is especially well suited to the mapping of complex (nonconvex and
high-dimensional) spaces, and it is frequently used for path planning problems that
involve obstacles and differential constraints. The conventional application of RRT is
robotic path planning [79]. However, the above description of space exploration may
also be understood abstractly. This has has led us to use this method to map the
RA space. By abstracting the search space to the trajectory space, we are effectively
searching for paths within that space (a 12 dimensional space if two waypoints are
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used) with the purpose of identifying the boundaries of goal regions describing tra-
jectories that create different RAs, as defined in our analysis by two 6-D waypoints.
From the model of aircraft dynamics and the guidance, a collection of waypoints im-
plicitly represents a trajectory that can be flown by the intruder aircraft relative to
the ownship. Thus, each node of the tree is an abstraction of a trajectory represented
by a collection of waypoints.
The pseudocode for constructing an RRT is given in Algorithm 1. For a precise
description of the RRT algorithm in its original form, please see [79]. The behavior
of the algorithm as applied here is as follows:
1. At every iteration, a 12-dimensional sample is defined. The sample corresponds
to a trajectory with two six-dimensional waypoints. The selection of the sample
is biased toward the largest unexplored region of the search space.
2. The node in the tree that is closest to the new sample is identified. The distance
used is the euclidean norm (in normalized coordinates).
3. The sample is projected toward the closest node, so that its distance to the
tree does not exceed a certain length. The distance is inversely related to the
density of points in the tree. Nodes will be far apart and spread over the space
when the search begins, and get closer together at every iteration.
4. The projected sample is linked to the tree with a new edge and becomes a
new node. The TCAS algorithm evaluates the corresponding trajectory for a
possible RA.
5. The newly created node is tagged with what RA, if any, is generated.
6. The tree is then ready for a new sample.
7. A search is deemed complete when the RRT space has been searched to an
89
adequate level of granularity (the authors typically constrained some of the
search variables and allowed the tree to grow to as much as 10 million nodes).
8. The nodes situated as close to the center of each RA region are selected as
the intruder trajectories in the simulator. Well-centered nodes are the most
likely to generate the desired RAs, since small changes that can occur in the
relative conditions between ownship and intruder still result in a node within
the RA region. The boundaries of the RA regions are defined by the edges
which connect two nodes labeled with two different RAs.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for constructing an RRT [92]
procedure Build RRT(xinit)
T .init(xinit);
for k = 1 to K do





procedure Extend(T , x)
xnear ← NEAREST NEIGHBOR(x, T );
if NEW STATE(x, xnear, xnew, unew) then
T .add vertex(xnew);
T .add edge(xnear, xnew, unew);









The RRT method maps the boundaries that partition the TCAS logic output by what
class of trajectories result in a specific RA. As an example of the insight provided
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by this mapping, Figure 33 shows a tree constructed by varying only two states in
the twelve-dimensional trajectory space. The ownship conditions are set at 7000 ft
altitude, level flight, 225 knots speed. The intruder starts with a head-on trajectory,
level. Only two of the intruder states are varied in this example: relative altitudes
at the first and the second waypoint. All other 10 states would normally be varied,
but are fixed in this example - as given in Table 8 - so that the mapping can be
accurately portrayed in two dimensions. Figure 34 represents the traffic situation in
the horizontal plane, relative to the ownship.
The growth of the tree reveals an obvious partition of the waypoint space in terms
of corresponding RAs. For clarity, the specific resolutions are grouped in terms of
their high-level categories of Up/Down and Corrective/Preventive.












































































































Figure 33: Construction of the RRT in the trajectory waypoint space
91
Table 8: Intruder states in RRT search example
States 1st Waypoint 2nd Waypoint
Relative Range (NM) 6 0
Relative Bearing (deg) 0 0
Relative Altitude (ft) variable variable
Speed (kts) 260 260
Relative Heading 180 180
Altitude Rate 0 0



















Figure 34: Horizontal plane traffic situation
Because the problem becomes over-constrained, some slack is required for fea-
sibility. We choose to allow some tolerance in the altitude rates. In the guidance
logic, the commanded relative altitude has priority over commanded altitude rate.
Therefore, the actual intruder trajectory does not always adhere to the altitude rate
prescribed in the waypoints constraints. Figure 35 shows the actual intruder altitude
and altitude rate recorded at time of RA. While waypoint constraints in Table 8 are
fixed at 0 altitude rate, a wider span is observed in the achieved intruder trajectories.
The mapping between the waypoint space and the realized intruder trajectory is
92

























Do Not Climb over 500 ft/min
Do Not Climb over 1000 ft/min
Do Not Climb over 2000 ft/min
Do Not Descend
Do Not Descend over 500 ft/min
Do Not Descend over 1000 ft/min
Do Not Descend over 2000 ft/min
Figure 35: Trajectory partition according to the relative altitude and altitude rate
at the time of the RA
not transparent, nor is it bijective. But this mapping has the advantage of encap-
sulating both the TCAS logic and the intruder guidance logic, and thus provides a
true black box approach with accessible controllability of the simulation outcome.
It is important to note the distinction between the waypoints and the commanded
trajectory which are static definitions produced by the RRT search, and the actual
trajectory which is dynamically simulated with changing conditions.
4.3 Results
This section presents the results of the inherent safety application. The piloted simu-
lator study is first explained, and serves the purpose of validating the accuracy of the
method. The section ends by presenting the application of the method to airspace
design.
4.3.1 Piloted simulator study
The HITL experiment examines pilot responses to TCAS in the context of an inte-
grated air traffic control and flight simulator facility [133]. The purpose of the study
is to identify how pilot interaction with ATC influences pilot responses to RAs, and
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conversely how features of the RA influence subsequent pilot communication with
ATC. The results of this study are reported in several papers [132–134].
Airline pilots fly a medium-fidelity simulated B747-400 in instrument meteorolog-
ical conditions [70] while interacting with an experimenter acting as air traffic con-
troller. The surrounding air traffic appears to the pilot on the TCAS traffic situation
display.
Nominal background air traffic is provided by the FAA Target Generation Facility
software (TGF), which connects to the simulator infrastructure over the High Level
Architecture connection (HLA). TGF replays traffic data recorded from airport op-
erations around the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. TGF also enables a human air traffic
controller to interact with the traffic by providing displays of the traffic environment.
Typically, piloted flights begin around an altitude of 10,000 to 20,000 feet and
lasted 15 minutes. Each pilot performs flights, and in each flight pilots encounter two
traffic scenarios. Some of scenarios result only in TAs and require no maneuvering,
while other scenarios result in TAs followed by RAs.
The pilots are tasked with flying one of three standard arrival route into DFW
airport. Figure 36 shows the fixes and the three arrival routes used in the experiment.
Typically, piloted flights began around an altitude of 10,000 to 20,000 feet and lasted
15 minutes. The flights ended during the approach intercept, i.e. when the aircraft
came within ‘one dot’ of the localizer beam indicating the approach course. Each
pilot flew eight scenarios, and in each scenario pilots encountered two traffic events.
Some of events resulted only in TAs and required no maneuvering, while other events
resulted in TAs followed by RAs. The RA locations for the first study are shown
approximatively in Figure 36. In the first study, the intruder trajectories for scenarios
C2, D2 and G were manually designed. All other scenarios used output from the RRT
search method.
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Figure 36: Arrival routes into DFW used in the experiment and approximate RA
locations in Study 1
4.3.2 Scenario creation
Scenarios are first sketched out on paper to identify key variables predicted to in-
fluence the type of TCAS RA they generate. These variables are then mapped to
intruder trajectories that are scripted into the simulation. However, none of these
first estimates of intruder trajectories are sufficient and they are iterated through re-
peated runs of the flight simulator in real-time with experimenters playing the role of
an actual pilot. This averaged roughly a day of flight simulator flights per scenario for
those scenarios that are configured manually, until an exact specification of intruder
trajectory is found that appears to be robust with respect to RA occurrence, albeit
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not always RA success - i.e. generating an RA but not always returning the desired
RA type.
In contrast, the scenarios developed using RRT start with the same paper sketch
to identify those initial segments of the intruder trajectory that would appear to be
realistic. This step identifies the intruder origination points in actual traffic streams,
such that trajectories would make sense to the pilot. The RRT method is then used
to identify the relative trajectory for this traffic following its origination from a traffic
stream. Once this trajectory is identified, it is entered in the simulator and a single
simulator flight is generally performed to verify it.
Therefore, in all studies involving pilot responses to TCAS, including the manual
scenarios, the best intent was made to create robust scenarios. The primary purpose
of these scenarios is not to serve as a baseline for the RRT method, but to setup test
conditions involving human subjects in an expensive and difficult simulator test [133].
Relative to a manual parametrization, which is a laborious and unrepeatable pro-
cess of trial and error, the RRT method is found to provide fast and generalizable
output that specifies the commanded intruder trajectory exactly.
4.3.3 Experimental validation
Four studies have been performed up to the time of writing this thesis. This section
analyzes the accuracy of the RRT method in generating RAs. These experiments
serve as validation for the trajectory analysis which can be then applied to airspace
design.
Figure 37 shows the expected and observed RAs from the four studies. The plot
also distinguished RRT and manually defined scenarios. These are only taken from
studies 1 and 4. The x-axis categorizes scenarios according to the expected RA. The
y-axis corresponds to the observed RA in each case. The data points are slightly
translated to show frequency. In a perfectly accurate experiment, where all observed
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RAs corresponded to expected RAs, clusters of data points would only appear along
the first diagonal.
Two metrics of accuracy can be defined: RA occurrence designates cases when
any RA was triggered, and RA success designates cases when the specific desired RA
was triggered.
Figure 38 quantifies the reliability of the RRT method under these two metrics.
Once again, results for the RRT and manual scenarios are only taken from studies
1 and 4, while the overall statistics encompass all studies. Table 9 shows the same
ratios for study 1. The reliability of the RRT method is apparent, in terms of RA
















































Figure 37: Expected vs Observed RAs in all 4 studies
In the first study, the RRT method was extremely effective in generating an RA,
with 100% RA existence in all but one scenario where it was used. Scenario D1 is
the exception, having an 88% RA occurrence rate, although when an RA did occur,
it was of the expected type. Crossing descents such as those used in traffic scenarios
E and F are the RAs most sensitive to variation in the ownship trajectory, and
are only possible within a small range of relative altitudes and altitude rates. The
























































Figure 38: Accuracy of RA generation
HITL simulation, indicated by the lesser RA success ratios. Furthermore, scenario B
involved contradictory information communicated to the pilot over the radio, which
further exacerbated variability in the trajectory flown by the pilot. Scenarios C2 and
D2 were scripted “manually”, to represent conflicts in particular traffic instances such
as during parallel landing approach, and do not use output from RRT. Scenario G
did not contain any RAs, and thus the RRT method was not used. These scenarios
are mentioned here for comparison purposes.
The robustness of the RRT system is illustrated by these high ratios. Furthermore,
another essential advantage of the RRT method is its ease of use. Relative to a manual
parametrization, which is a laborious and unrepeatable process of trial and error, the
RRT method was found to provide fast and generalizable output that specified the
commanded intruder trajectory exactly. This method, here applied to generating
RAs, can be used to establish traffic events in a general sense. Such means of testing
are key to the development of ACAS X [81] and other related systems which are
in turn vital to the development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen).
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Table 9: Experiment design and RRT method reliability




1 A Climb after HIKAY 100% 100%
1 B Climb after KARLA, con-
flicting radio information
100% 57%
1 C1 Descend between HOWDY
and TACKE
100% 100%
1 D1 Descend after UKW 88% 88%
1 E Crossing Descent after
COVIE
100% 88%
1 F Crossing Descent after
TACKE
100% 94%
1 H Descend after LEMYN 100% 69%
Manual
1 C2 Climb after DIETZ, VFR
traffic
100% 82%
1 D2 Monitor Vertical Speed after
HIKAY, intercept approach
69% 63%
1 G TA only n/a n/a
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4.4 Airspace design insights
4.4.1 Route clustering
The accurate characterization of trajectory risk through the RRT method is validated
in the experimental context. To serve the purpose of this thesis, the next step is
applying this method to support airspace design.
The application starts with the the compilation of trajectory clusters. Figure 39
shows a plot of 5,000 possible trajectories which result in a climb RA being issued.
The plot is in relative coordinates in the ownship body frame (the x axis points toward
the front of the ownship). The two plots show the three-dimensional and longitudinal
sections of the plot.
However, the spatial distribution only tells half the story: the velocities are essen-
tial for determining the risk of collision and thus triggering an RA. Figure 40 shows
the phase plots (position and velocity) for these same trajectories along the longitudi-
nal and vertical directions. In these, the distribution of trajectories is more apparent.
For example, the vertical phase plot clearly shows that trajectories coming from below
and climbing are predominantly responsible for generating Climb RAs. While this
result in general is intuitive, a precise quantification of the concerned trajectories is
not.
(a) Three-dimensional plot (b) Longitudinal section plot
Figure 39: Trajectories resulting in Climb RA
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(a) Longitudinal phase plot (b) Vertical phase plot
Figure 40: Phase space plots for Climb RA trajectories
From the trajectories, the convex hull of the clusters can be extracted. The hull
delimits the set of trajectories resulting in a specific RA, and is defined in the phase
space which has six dimensions: three dimensions for the physical position, and three
dimensions for the velocity of the intruder aircraft relative to the ownship. Figure
41 shows the hull of the Climb RA cluster. The plots represent the cluster in three-











































Figure 41: Cluster characterization for Climb RA
These clusters are defined in relative coordinates. The application to airspace
design requires them to be overlaid on defined flows. The full design process must
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account for both position and velocity characteristics and the different kinds of pos-
sible RAs. Representing all six-dimensional constraints is not possible visually, but
such information can be included in flow design and autonomous routing algorithms.
If only spatial constraints are represented, Figure 42 shows a planar projection of
a flow and the corresponding unsafe zone for Climb RA. This figure illustrates how
TCAS mapping can be applied to airspace design. For each flow, areas surrounding
it are characterized as unsafe for different kinds of resolutions. Other flows or trajec-
tories which would pass through these areas pose a safety risk, which can be handled










































Figure 42: Unsafe areas in the airspace
The unsafe trajectory cluster adheres to the definition of a lean model.
First, a lean model is a compact descriptor - the multidimensional convex polyhe-
dra that define the cluster surfaces are simple, multilinear, geometric shapes. Second,
the lean model has forecasting ability - experimental validation has shown that tra-
jectories inside the cluster lead to TCAS advisories. Third, the lean model can guide
systematic airspace design - the cluster allows the mapping of design variables (specif-
ically, route geometry) to design evaluation metrics (specifically, inherent safety).
Fourth, the lean model requires low computational cost for use online - the cluster
envelopes are polyhedra that define linear constraints in a computer program.
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4.4.2 Flow characterization
This section illustrates an application of the unsafe clusters to airspace design. The
merit of the method is that clusters are able to systematically capture route character-
ization by using the relatively simple geometrical formulation of a polyhedron. Since
the clusters are six-dimensional, the constraints put on route geometries are com-
plex: restrictions are not simply where routes go, but also how. Specifically, velocity
caps can be introduced, and the explicit relation to desired spatial flow separation is
accessible.
Currently, flow velocity constraints and spatial positioning are determined and
parametrized ad-hoc. Letters of agreement at sector hand-off points define altitude
and velocity bounds based on intuition and experience, rather than a systematic
analysis. By providing a quantitative way to relate the allowed vertical rate in a
climbing flow and the vertical separation to a level flow above, the clusters described
in this chapter have several applications.
The geometric descriptors can predict cases where routes will need to be redesigned
based on TCAS alerts. A noteworthy such case is the Dallas Bump geometry [167].
The name is fairly descriptive: a departure path existed at Dallas Fort Worth airport
where aircraft climbing at the prescribed rate of 3,500 feet per minute toward FL 170
conflicted with steady aircraft at FL 180. The traffic geometry is shown in Figure 43.
Figure 43: Dallas Bump geometry
From an intent-based perspective, the traffic situation in nominally safe: if the
level-off occurs as it should, there would be no problem. However, the situation is
103
not safe from a state-based perspective. Given the existing positions and velocities of
the aircraft, any deviation from the prescribed clearance would present a near-miss
risk. Therefore, TCAS “Climb” RAs were frequently issued to the latter, resulting in
a trajectory that appears to go over a bump. At the same time, the climbing aircraft
would receive a “Monitor Vertical Speed” advisory. Because of the persistence of
these events, a cap was introduced on the maximum vertical rate of 1,000 feet per
minute above FL 150, which in turn solved the problem.
An example of the benefits given by the cluster method in such a traffic geometry
include the ability to explicitly predict the trade-off between flow vertical separation
and climb rate. This relation is nothing more than the outline of the cluster poly-
hedron exterior surface over the two dimensions of interest, altitude difference and
altitude rate, respectively. Figure 44 represents a zoomed perspective on the cluster
outer surface. The plot represents the trade-off between maximum climb rate allowed
and vertical separation between flows. Trajectories with a vertical rate that remains
below the boundary are outside the cluster and therefore safe. Trajectories with a
vertical rate above the boundary are inside the unsafe cluster. To better illustrate
the meaning of the separation frontier, a sample of trajectories are represented inside
the cluster: each dot represents a trajectory that results in a “Climb” RA.
4.5 Summary
The research applies a Rapidly-exploring Random Tree algorithm to establish such
a mapping between the space of relative trajectories and the space of TCAS RAs.
The algorithm explores the space of intruder trajectories as defined by multiple 6-D
waypoints (three dimensions for position and three dimensions for velocity). The
TCAS logic evaluates the different intruder trajectories relative to the ownship and
issues the relevant RA, should any be required. The mapping is used to select the
trajectory waypoint most likely to result in specific RAs.
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Figure 44: Trade-off between climb rate and flow separation
Such waypoints corresponding to a desired advisory can be converted into trajec-
tories flown by intruder aircraft during the HITL simulations. Experimental testing
shows that the RRT method provides faster, easier, more generalizable, and more
robust results relative to manual parametrization, which is slow, tedious, and comes
after a trial and error process specific to each traffic circumstance.
By demonstrating robustness, the results from piloted simulations highlight the
potential of this method for pilot training and for research and development.
Having validated the RRT’s ability to map trajectories to TCAS advisories in the
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HITL experiment, this method can now be applied to airspace design by defining clus-
ters of risky trajectories. These clusters are defined in six dimensions, encompassing
spatial and kinematic information. The multidimensional extent of these clusters con-
stitutes unsafe zones, in spatial and kinematic terms. Flow design must account for
these dangerous geometries and thus avoid risky trajectories by constraining distance,
velocities, or both. Such unsafe zones can be proactively eliminated from designed
airspace through the use of explicit trade-off relations.
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CHAPTER V
UNIFYING PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSED METHOD
This chapter presents the methodological contribution of the thesis. In this method-
ology, data mining and aggregation are used offline to synthesize lean models of the
system. Lean models describe system behavior at a high-level. These compact de-
scriptors can then be used to design the airspace and rapidly iterate. Their main
benefit is requiring scarce computational resources for use online. The offline gener-
ation can be heavy but only needs to be performed once.
A discussion of the current approach to airspace design is conducted in Section
5.1. The potential of big data is highlighted in Section 5.2, where the data sources
used in the thesis are also explained. A comparison of approaches to simulation is
presented in Section 5.3, and the contributed methodology - data aggregation and
lean model synthesis - is explained in Section 5.4.
5.1 The problem of current airspace design
Airspace design is a complex matter which has not been systematically undertaken.
Airspace has historically been redesigned by operational personnel and is a mixture
of art and science. Local airspace experts identify problems such as heavy traffic, and
propose solutions. Few quantitative techniques are used to evaluate potential designs.
The entire process from problem definition to design evaluation is iterative [42]. While
able to refine and improve proposed solutions, this process is heavily anchored in past
experience and requires significant time and resources.
Airspace design is usually limited to resectorization and flow management. This
localized focus may create propagating phenomena through the NAS which are not
anticipated or understood. Efforts have focused on capacity improvements through
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weather prediction [84], routing optimization [151], airport arrival and departure
queuing [4], flow metering and ground holding.
Reducing controller workload has been a constraint leading to resectorization,
without being used in more systematic airspace design which includes routes and
flows. For example, the FAA Sector Design Analysis Tool (SDAT) uses several metrics
such as required intervention rate to evaluate the effect of airspace and traffic changes
on sector capacity and traffic complexity [54]. In some cases, newly redesigned sectors
have been created smaller and with fewer traffic flows. For example, sectors ZMP15
and ZMP16 in Minneapolis center are dominated by aircraft arrivals into Minneapolis
- St. Paul International Airport and are significantly smaller than other sectors in the
center. But a limitation of smaller sectors is the need for additional controller staff,
the reduced ability to perform efficient conflict avoidance maneuvers, and increased
coordination between adjacent sectors to handle aircraft transitions [160].
NASA has recognized the importance of novel airspace design methods, and has
created the Dynamic Airspace Configuration (DAC) technical area to group projects
on this topic [82]. Initial concepts applicable to DAC focus on three types of airspace:
restructured, adaptable, and generic. Restructured airspace is designed to get the
most efficiency through technologies such as self-separation and 4D-trajectories. Adapt-
able airspace is fluidly reorganized to accommodate fluctuating demand. Generic
airspace is designed in a way that promotes interchangeability among facilities and
controllers.
The concepts are also aimed at different time horizons. The mid-term concepts dis-
tinguish between high-altitude airspace with user-preferred routings - involving tubes
or corridors in the sky [59] - and low-altitude airspace with super density and metro-
plex areas around the busiest airports. The long-term airspace concepts distinguish
four types of regions: airspace with automated separation assurance, high-altitude
airspace, super density and metroplex airspace, and traditional structured airspace.
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More systematic processes are now being developed. Some of these use quanti-
tative analysis to define target concepts, which are then shaped by subject matter
experts to achieve operational feasibility [27]. Nevertheless, these methods remain
anchored in past or present operational paradigms and are unsuited for future con-
cepts of operation for which more comprehensive and less empirical approaches are
needed.
The idea of using conflict risk assessment for airspace planning and design has only
been recently mentioned in the literature [111], but so far only the conflict risk model
has been published. The model is intended to compare different airspace designs
and organizational scenarios under different traffic flow levels, but no applications or
design considerations resulting from it are available at this time.
The problem of airspace design requires a formulation which must address several
key points resulting from the primary function of the airspace. Designing airspace
means operationalizing a concept. Formally, a concept is a definition of function
allocation and associated performance requirements. Since the airspace is meant to
safely allow the movement of aircraft, considerations must include safety, routing,
and priorities [12]. While humans maintain an active involved role, concern for their
capabilities and limitations is a fourth consideration.
5.2 Making sense of big data sources
Airspace design is presently driven mainly by an empirical iterative process reliant
on subject matter expertise with a geographically localized focus [42]. Considerable
research has been put into devising analytic metrics that evaluate air traffic health,
starting from the simplistic Monitor Alert Parameter (MAP) which is directly related
to average sector flight time per aircraft [48], to measures of complexity [105] and
dynamic density [101].
Analytic models, however, require fitting with empirical data before they can be
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parametrized and become directly applicable. Aviation, like so many other fields, has
now entered the age of big data. A multitude of possible data sources exists which
could potentially be used for a more data-driven approach to airspace design. Exam-
ples of relevant data include air traffic scenarios, airspace configurations and airport
layouts, aircraft performance characteristics, and airline economics. Yet reports have
identified a lack of concertation in database assembly and maintenance, thus failing
to effectively use the potential of this wealth of information [114].
A noteworthy effort in this direction is the deployment by the FAA of the Per-
formance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS) since 1999 [31]. PDARS
contains detailed aircraft tracking information along with a range of performance
measures such as traffic counts, travel times, travel distances, traffic flows, and in-
trail separations. A more basic database is the Enhanced Traffic Management System
(ETMS). ETMS contains aircraft trajectories from 1 minute radar tracking and some
metadata such as filed flight plan and transponder information (aircraft type, ICAO
24-bit address,...) for each recorded aircraft.
Making sense of this wealth of data is a difficult endeavor that has yet to be fully
exploited. PDARS shows how data mining has been gradually put to use over the past
decade in air traffic management, but its applications remain limited to descriptive
performance diagnosis and anomaly detection. Approaches include identifying loss
of separation [110] or more general controller operational errors [109], estimating
weather-caused delays [108], and airspace complexity estimation [145]. Almost no
research seeks to extract models which could be used proactively in airspace design
under future concepts of operation, such as applying current conflict detection to
forecasting free flight conditions [2].
The gap in research corresponds to a gap from analysis to design. Data is cur-
rently used on a descriptive level, while airspace design requires it to be applied in a
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prescriptive way, such that insights can be systematically extracted. For the demon-
strations to airspace design shown in Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis uses data generated
from several various sources dealing with aircraft guidance, navigation, and surveil-
lance. In each case, data is aggregated into a database whose specificity depends on
the intended application. After aggregation, the data is analyzed, and a model is
synthesized. Design insights can be obtained from the prescriptive use of the model.
For the control cost CD&R module presented in Chapter 3, an uncontrolled open-
loop air traffic model is used [160]. The uncontrolled air traffic model attempts to
simulate traffic without controller intervention. The overlay of a conflict detection and
resolution algorithm [161] thus allows an estimate of required controller interventions
in the airspace by replicating potential conflicts which need to be resolved. The
traffic model is based on a resampling of historical aircraft radar data taken from
ETMS, with added variance corresponding to the observed probability distributions
of parameters such as aircraft types, exact routing relative to filed flight plan, sector
entry and exit points.
Using this method for generating traffic conditions is an easy alternative to soft-
ware such as the Future ATM Concepts Evaluation Tool (FACET) developed at
NASA Ames Research Center [14], which is ITAR-restricted and was unavailable to
the author for security reasons. FACET is a sophisticated simulation engine which
uses aircraft performance profiles, airspace models, weather data, and flight schedules
to individually model trajectories for the climb, cruise, and descent phases of flight
for each type of aircraft. Like FACET, the sampling method used in the taskload
CD&R module presented in Chapter 3 is capable of quickly generating and analyzing
thousands of aircraft trajectories.
For the control cost autonomous module, also presented in Chapter 3, trajectory
data was generated through a stochastic process in a Monte Carlo simulation. The
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stochastic process represents the variable trajectories of aircraft which follow pre-
scribed 4D flows. The 4D flows correspond to routes that are identified by clustering
observed traffic [52]. The centroids of the clusters are pieced together into a network
graph model of the airspace [99].
For the inherent safety application shown in Chapter 4, a database was generated
by simulating pairs of aircraft trajectories using a flight control model designed for
ATC simulations. The model uses an adaptive control architecture for stability, and
allows the specification of the closed-loop behavior of the aircraft [75]. The relative
trajectory pairs are defined by a series of waypoints with position and velocity con-
straints. These waypoints and their corresponding TCAS resolution advisories are
stored into a tree structure. Further post-processing allows a reduction of the tree to
multidimensional convex polyhedra, which are much simpler to represent.
5.3 The gap between analysis and design
The essential question that is related to the available data sources is its use within a
coherent and reasoned level of detail. Therefore, it is vital to understand what the
appropriate level of detail is. Indeed, more detail in a model or simulation seldom
directly implies greater accuracy of the results.
Most research directions have directly applied the wealth of available data to seed
complex large-scale simulations. The modern approach enabled by distributed com-
puting and accessible processing power is based on multi-agent simulations. The ben-
efits of agent-based simulations are high fidelity and the ability to discover emergent
properties, as well as the relatively straightforward validation. While discrete-event
simulations have been successfully used for established operations [157], agent-based
simulations are a promising path toward evaluating and comparing new concepts that
can be explicitly parametrized by locus of control [131] or function allocation [80].
A recent application of agent-based simulations is assessing air traffic risk. Risk has
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traditionally been modeled by fault trees and other sequential and epidemiological
accident models. Systemic accident models consider accidents to occur because of
complex and variable interactions which are suited for simulation using agents [154].
Agent-based models have been applied to many aspects of traffic and transporta-
tion systems such as dynamic routing, congestion management, and intelligent traffic
control, on different modes including road, rail, and air [21]. Air traffic management
systems such as the NAS are believed to be based on complex emergent behavior [150].
In such systems, phenomena emerge from interactions between individuals and can-
not be predicted from examining individual behavior. Agent-based simulations which
integrate cognitive models of human performance, physical models of technology be-
havior and descriptions of the operating environment are therefore a plausible method
of forecasting the impact of new concepts of operation.
Conversely, traditional optimizations using utility functions are inadequate for the
design of a cooperative distributed air traffic control system. Where utility functions
do not account for sophisticated social behavior, multi-agent simulations may use
game theory to design such a complex system [57]. Integrated gate-to-gate modeling
tools which capture the interactions of participants in the NAS through large-scale,
distributed agent-based simulations are meant to develop and evaluate system-wide
candidate operational concepts for air traffic control [155].
A wide review of agent-based models and equation-based models has concluded
that “agent-based modeling is most appropriate for domains characterized by a high
degree of localization and distribution and dominated by discrete decisions. Equation-
based modeling is most naturally applied to systems that can be modeled centrally,
and in which the dynamics are dominated by physical laws rather than information
processing” [118].
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Agent-based simulations are not the ideal choice under all circumstances. Emer-
gence is not always a requirement, or primary consideration, and can even be a down-
side as a low-level to high-level mapping is not achieved in the process. The weakness
of wide-scale simulations is their cost in resources, time, and the heavy framework
required to simulate complex systems. Agent-based simulations that involve complex
systems require significant effort in their development, as detailed interactions must
be identified and modeled. Lighter equation-based simulations can and should be
used in the initial stages to identify key configurations. A risk which could lead to
waste of resources by simulation designers and users is the selection of models inap-
propriate for their needs [114]. An example of such inappropriate use is creating a
highly-detailed model for planning infrastructure developments such as airport capac-
ity expansion. For such broad long-term policy decisions, lean approximate models
are more adequate than a detailed simulation which requires exact layouts and pre-
cise but speculative and uncertain flight schedules far into the future. Therefore, it is
important to recognize the relation between the design problem and the model choice.
5.4 Proposed methodology
The methodological contribution of the thesis is an approach to airspace design using
lean models. Rules of a general methodology can be defined based on the demonstra-
tions for control cost, in Chapter 3, and for inherent safety, in Chapter 4, respectively.
The methodology has the purpose of adding control cost and inherent safety as metrics
of airspace design, where traditionally these have been constraints on the objective
of adding capacity and minimizing delays. The importance of inherent safety and
control cost as functional objectives in a reframed problem of airspace design has
been discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2.
The use of lean models is a result of a natural flowdown from the airspace view
to the requirements. The perspective of the airspace is given in Chapter 2, and
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poses two main questions. The first question that comes from the perspective on the
airspace and is on the appropriate level of detail. The research seeks to identify the
macroscopic effects of operational changes on the strategic level. The second question
that comes from the perspective on the airspace is on the appropriate computational
technique. The objective of the research is to map low-level changes to high-level
properties, and provide predictive results that can inform airspace design decisions.
Choosing the appropriate level of detail allows a discussion of design insights. The
scope of the lean model is situated at a level of granularity that identifies the macro-
scopic effects of operational changes on the strategic level. For example, Chapter 3
shows that complex interactions between many different stochastic components that
determine the control cost of a system can be simplified to a single parameter de-
scription. The lean model also provides design insights, such as the fact that the flow
scheduling has marginal effect on control cost, while autonomous navigation error
and tolerance play a very significant role. Finally, the model shows that reducing the
autonomy ratio has a less drastic effect on the controlled network than increasing the
traffic. Thus, some level of autonomy can serve as a safeguard against heavy control
cost due to traffic volume increases. Likewise, Chapter 4 shows that the inherent
safety of routes can be characterized, determined, and predicted by a relatively sim-
ple convex polyhedra (albeit multi-dimensional and involving spatial and kinematic
information).
Choosing the appropriate computational technique allows an analysis of the effect
of design variables. The lean model technique maps low-level changes to high-level
properties and provides predictive results. For example, Chapter 3 shows how the
two design variables, route geometry and autonomy allocation, influence control cost.
Thus, the autonomy ratio affects control cost from the controlled subnetwork in an ex-
ponential manner, but has an almost linear effect on control cost from the autonomous
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subnetwork. On the other hand, traffic volume affects control cost from both sub-
networks in approximately linear fashion, both in terms of mean but also regarding
standard deviation. The higher standard deviation indicates a large variability, which
is more costly in cognitive terms, and signals an unpredictable and potentially unsafe
system. Likewise, Chapter 4 provides direct trade-off relations between spatial and
kinematic constraints on route geometries that preserve safety. The demonstration
quantifies an intuitive result, specifically that maximum tolerable altitude rate on a
climbing flow is quasi-inversely related to the vertical separation with a flow some
distance above the level-off altitude.
Lean models are a natural outcome of these two requirements. Lean models
are defined by four characteristics: they are compact descriptors, have forecasting
ability, can guide systematic airspace design, and require low computational cost for
use online. The use of lean models allows the mapping of design variables (route
geometry, autonomy allocation) to design evaluation metrics (inherent safety, control
cost).
In the methodology presented by this thesis, data mining and aggregation are used
offline to synthesize lean models of the system. These models can be used to design
the airspace and rapidly iterate with many parameter combinations. The goal of the
methodology is to support systematic airspace design with additional new metrics.
Through the methodology, detailed operational and airspace characteristics can be
defined ex post rather than fed into the models ex ante. Thus, the methodology is
normative where more conventional approaches are evaluative.
Compact descriptors are not a requirement for systematic airspace design, and a
different approach has used granular agent-based simulations, as discussed in Section
5.3. A practical benefit of the lean model methodology relative to the high-definition
simulations is requiring scarce computational resources for use online. The offline
generation is computationally intensive, but only needs to be performed once. The
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resulting models which are synthesized from data aggregation are lean, but also suffi-
ciently precise and usable in a deductive manner to identify design recommendations.
The two approaches may also be used in conjunction, by identifying promising or crit-
ical configurations through the aggregated models, and then refining design decisions
and precisely evaluating circumstances through a narrowly-scoped, higher-resolution,
targeted simulation.
With this methodology, airspace can be redesigned to solve identified limitations.
The design process is scoped and guided by performance considerations, as it has long
been advocated [55]. The performance effects can be output from the lean models,
and refined by ulterior high-definition simulations. Such an approach is preferable
to a random search where metrics to allow comparisons or rankings between possible
configurations are doubtful, or an exhaustive search which is an intractable and futile




The research presented in this thesis is motivated by the fact that air traffic demand
is growing. Air traffic operations must change to ensure performance, rather than
focus on integrating technology. The approach to airspace design must account for
such new concepts of operations. As operations change, the approach to airspace
design must also be radically altered. Thus, there is a need for methods that can
enable new designs, do not depend on the current concept of operations, and can also
support quantifiable performance goals.
First, models that can integrate additional design objectives differ from past ap-
proaches. In the past, airspace planning has focused on capacity and delay improve-
ments through flow management, with the inclusion of taskload and safety as con-
straints. Second, models that support a range of concepts of operations must not be
pinned to current operations. No such systematic design methods exist, which are
not conceptually reliant on current operations. Third, predictive models are needed
to guide airspace design or enable new design methods. For this, predictive and
parsimonious models of airspace under the new paradigm are a necessary step.
The perspective of the airspace used in this thesis is a specific one. The focus is on
the enroute portion of flight, and is concerned with strategic decisions. Two design
variables parametrize this vision of the airspace: the geometry of the flows, and the
delegated autonomy and authority for separation. Three metrics are relevant to the
perspective taken in the thesis: control cost, inherent safety, and capacity.
The first contribution of the thesis is to demonstrate two applications of airspace
analysis and design: assessing the inherent safety and control cost of the airspace.
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Two results are shown, a model which estimates control cost depending on autonomy
allocation and traffic volume, and the characterization of inherent safety conditions
which prevent unsafe trajectories. The second contribution of the thesis is a set
of guiding principles that unifies the cases of application and proposes a general
methodology. In this approach, data mining and aggregation are used offline to
synthesize lean models of the system. These compact descriptors can then be used
to design the airspace and rapidly iterate.
The first application is focused on control cost. The research uses a Monte Carlo
simulator framework which allocates directly controlled routes and autonomous self-
deconflicting 4-D trajectory flows in the airspace. Several stochastic models of aircraft
scheduling, navigation precision, and conflict detection and resolution are intercon-
nected in the simulation.
Results show that complex interactions between many different stochastic com-
ponents that determine the control cost of a system can be simplified to a single
parameter description. The lean model also provides design insights, such as the
fact that the flow scheduling has marginal effect on control cost, while autonomous
navigation error and tolerance play a very significant role. Finally, the model shows
that reducing the autonomy ratio has a less drastic effect on the controlled network
than increasing the traffic. Thus, some level of autonomy can serve as a safeguard
against heavy control cost due to traffic volume increases. Results also show how
the two design variables, route geometry and autonomy allocation, influence control
cost. Thus, the autonomy ratio affects control cost from the controlled subnetwork
in an exponential manner, but has an almost linear effect on control cost from the
autonomous subnetwork. On the other hand, traffic volume affects control cost from
both subnetworks in approximately linear fashion, both in terms of mean but also
regarding standard deviation. The higher standard deviation indicates a large vari-
ability, which is more costly in cognitive terms, and signals an unpredictable and
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potentially unsafe system.
The second application is focused on inherent safety. The research demonstrates
a novel method to reliably generate collision avoidance advisories, in piloted simu-
lations, by the widely-used TCAS. The TCAS advisory issued to a pilot is highly
sensitive to the trajectory of an intruder aircraft relative to the ownship flown by the
pilot. In realistic piloted simulations, a pre-scripted intruder trajectory will not reli-
ably result in the relative dynamics that lead to a desired TCAS advisory. Further,
the complexity of the TCAS logic requires a novel method for mapping trajectories
to the range of possible advisories. The research uses a Rapidly-exploring Random
Tree algorithm in large-scale fast-time simulations to establish the mapping between
the space of relative trajectories and TCAS advisories. These trajectories are then
created in piloted simulations through guidance algorithms. Experimental piloted
simulations results demonstrate the ease of use and robustness of this method, and
validate the characterization of trajectories according to their safety risk. The unsafe
trajectory clusters are described by convex surfaces. These convex surfaces, when
overlapped on several flows from the route network, indicate hazard zones. These
hazard zones are the areas which lead to unsafe trajectories and must be avoided by
all other routes in the network, in addition to nominal separation requirements. The
method supports safety-centered airspace design.
Results show that the inherent safety of routes can be characterized, determined,
and predicted by relatively simple convex polyhedra (albeit multi-dimensional and
involving spatial and kinematic information). Results also provide direct trade-off
relations between spatial and kinematic constraints on route geometries that preserve
safety. The demonstration quantifies an intuitive result, specifically that maximum
tolerable altitude rate on a climbing flow is quasi-inversely related to the vertical
separation with a flow some distance above the level-off altitude.
The thesis generalizes unifying principles from these two demonstrations to define
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a new approach to airspace design. Systematic analytic modeling is a desirable di-
rection, however such models require fitting with empirical data before they can be
parametrized and become directly applicable. A higher level of detail is not always
better, and bridging the gap between analysis and design is another challenge.
The second contribution of the thesis is the approach to airspace design using lean
models. The use of lean models is a result of a natural flowdown from the airspace
view to the requirements. The first question posed by the perspective on the airspace
is the appropriate level of detail. Choosing the appropriate level of detail allows
a discussion of design insights. The scope of the lean model is situated at a level
of granularity that identifies the macroscopic effects of operational changes on the
strategic level. Choosing the appropriate computational technique allows an analysis
of the effect of design variables. The lean model technique maps low-level changes to
high-level properties and provides predictive results.
The proposed methodology has three steps: aggregate data, synthesize lean model,
guide design. In the first step, a database is built and mined. In the second step,
a lean model, as defined above, is synthesized. The third step is the extraction of
insights in design choices and a focus on promising aspects for further localized and
detailed simulations.
6.1 Suggested extension to capacity
This thesis has not focused on designing airspace for capacity because of the large
body of knowledge surrounding it [63]. However, the methods developed in this thesis
can be extended such that capacity can be addressed in a similar manner to the two
other topics discussed in the thesis, safety and control cost.
A possible approach to designing airspace for capacity has been presented by
the author elsewhere [100, 124]. The research focuses on the potential of mean field
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games [90]. The approach is in line with the methodology of the thesis, which advo-
cates airspace design by using lean models constructed from aggregated data.
The purpose of the mean field games model is to model routing decisions which
would be made by autonomous aircraft, thereby predicting congestion and demand
propagation. The mean field games model therefore fits as a complement to the
other empirical applications by addressing capacity issues. The model is meant to be
used for capacity-centered airspace design, in relation to the taskload-centered and
safety-centered approaches discussed in the thesis.
From a computational perspective, two possible approaches exist: continuous in-
finite state-space and discrete finite state-space. The first approach is the numerical
resolution of the coupled partial differential equations with states defined continu-
ously in both time and space. Aircraft are modeled by a density distribution over the
entire possible space. This model is closest to the formal application of mean field
games but unsuitable for complex systems because of the processing requirements.
For a complex graph used in a route network, the connectivity matrix alone is
a few few hundred lines, and expressing costs or state transitions quickly becomes
impractical in a numerical environment. Foreseeable difficulties in the continuous
approach could arise because of processing cost and stability of the equation dis-
cretization schemes.
The second approach is the numerical simulation using discrete state definitions.
In this approach, individual agents are considered. These agents have a finite number
of possible options. Agents define their strategy based on a mean distribution of
the other agents. This approach is better suited to the graph model of possible
trajectories.
Foreseeable difficulties in the discrete approach could arise in the expression of this
complex routing problem in a way which avoids infinite recursive calls. Furthermore,
it is not clear if implicit calculation of all individual strategies can be avoided while
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the optimal strategies are being elaborated. Such a full computation which would
defy the point of the mean field games model and likely produce as much processing
overload as the continuous, infinite-state approach.
6.2 Suggested future directions
The work decomposition can be expressed in the generic systems engineering nomen-
clature represented in Figure 2, in Chapter 1: the proposed concept of operations
and triple objectives of design discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively, reframe
the airspace design problem, thus essentially establishing new requirements. The two
contributions of the thesis follow at a more applied level. The demonstrations in
Chapters 3 and 4 make up the detailed design, while the unifying methodology in
Chapter 5 is a formalization of the architecture.
The work presented in the thesis has thus followed a top-down approach going from
concept (most abstract) to detailed design (least abstract). The systems engineering
model suggests future steps which can take the bottom-up approach. Such a reverse
approach would place this thesis in a continuity and close the loop. Future follow-up
work can build up from the detailed design exhibited here to integrated functions,
system verification, and validation [135]. These future steps would address questions
such as:
Integration: How to connect the different models and applications?
Verification: Does the system meet specifications?
Validation: Does the system address the needs?
To implement a bottom-up approach, a common thread must be identified for
integration. A suggested common perspective could be the micro/macro duality of
scale which has been used in this thesis. The lean model methodology establishes
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a mapping going from microscopic causes (individual trajectory deviations and un-
certainties) to macroscopic effects (aggregated control cost, and intrinsic safety of a
route design). The suggested extension to capacity mentioned in Section 6.1 could
also adhere to this schema, since routing strategies are established at the micro level
of individual aircraft, resulting in traffic flow dynamics and congestion at the macro
level. However, the spatial scale of the different applications remains somewhat differ-
ent: the application to control cost and taskload deals with cross-sector trajectories,
while the application to safety is based on results over a few nautical miles. Nev-
ertheless, the approach shown in this thesis uses that safety information to provide
more macroscopic flow safety information.
In future work, the low-level to high-level mappings and models constructed in the
thesis can thus be integrated to guide design of the airspace, but also to test concepts
for verification and validation purposes. This research can thus bring value to efforts
meant to design or identify superior and inferior airspace structures. For design,
the safety and control cost models can be applied to create representative airspace
structures by varying concept parameters. For testing, the models can evaluate the
airspace characteristics for these metrics.
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APPENDIX A
THEORETICAL DERIVATIONS OF CONTROL COST
PROBABILITY
This section details theoretical derivations supporting the taskload application. For-
mulas related to the autonomous navigation model and taskload probabilities for
several basic elements of a route structure are shown.
A.1 Aircraft model
Boundary hitting times The probability density function for the first hitting
time of a boundary τ
(k)
1 = inf{t : Xt ≥ k} for an origin at X0 and a level k by
an unidimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has the closed-form solution shown in
Equation (9), as given by [93]























In the multidimensional case, no closed-form solution is known for the first hitting
time density function of a correlated Brownian motion with drift [102]. Such an n-
dimensional stochastic process Xt is a solution to (10). But through a change of
variables and by using the scalability property of the Wiener process, the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process given in (2) can be re-written as (11).









From comparing (11) to (10), for which no closed-form solution of the first hitting time
density is known, it becomes apparent that attempting to express hitting time den-
sity for a multidimensional correlated Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a daunting task.
An assumption of uncorrelated dimensions must therefore be adopted. By assuming
that the along-track and cross-track deviations are decoupled (an assumption previ-
ously used in [115]), then implicitly the subjacent unidimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
processes can be considered to be uncorrelated.
Taskload probability From this, a measure of the taskload required for controlling
an individual aircraft is obtained as the probability of the number of interventions over
a given period Tmax. Assuming all realizations of the aircraft trajectory (after each
corrective intervention from the controller) are independent, the (discrete) probability
(12) is obtained from autoconvoluting the hitting times density:
P [N (T ) ≥ n] = P [τ1 + ...+ τn ≤ Tmax]








Here fτ (t) is the hitting time density function, N
(T ) is the number of corrections





























fτ (x) · fτ (t− x)dx
Therefore, for n ≥ 1 the probability of the number of interventions is (13).
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P [N (T ) = 0] = 1− P [N (T ) ≥ 1]




FTE stochastic model calibration By applying Itō’s lemma, it can be shown
that for any fixed s and t, 0 ≤ s ≤ t, the random variable Xt conditional upon
Xs of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has the form (15), where N (0, 1) denotes a
standard normal distribution. The relationship (16) between consecutive observations
Xi and Xi+1 with a timestep δt is therefore affine with an independent and identically
distributed random noise ε.
Xt = Xse
−κ(t−s) + µ(1− e−κ(t−s)) . . .






· N (0, 1) (15)
Xi+1 = aXi + b+ ε (16)
A least squares linear regression is used to identify the recursion parameters a, b,
and the standard deviation of the noise σε, from which the parameters (17) of the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic differential equation (2) can be deduced.












A maximum likelihood estimate method was also conducted. From (16), {Xi+1−
aXi − b = ε} is a normal random variable, and so the conditional probability density
function of Xi+1 given Xi with a time step δt is shown in (18), while the log-likelihood
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· · · = −n
2
ln 2π − n ln σ̂ . . .




[Xi+1 −Xie−κδt − µ(1− e−κδt)]2 (19)







gives the system in (20).



















[Xi+1 − µe−κδt(Xi − µ)]2 (20)
A.2 Analytic taskload probabilities
Single lane From the Poisson process flow model in (5), the probability of the
number of aircraft M simultaneously controlled (a random variable) can be deduced:
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if it takes an aircraft Tcross to cross the airspace, then the probability that at any
given time there are k aircraft present is given in (21); if there are M = k ≥ 1 aircraft
present, and the aircraft i requires N
(T )
i interventions over time T , then the total
taskload the controller is subject to has a probability given in (22).
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P{N (T )} represents k−1 discrete autoconvolutions of the single aircraft
taskload probability P{N (T )} from (13). Obviously for M = 0, there will be no









P{N (T )}[n] =
n∑
i=0












P{N (T )}[i] · P [N (T ) = n− i]
Since the number of aircraft is a random variable, combining (21) and (22) gives
the probability (23) of the overall taskload N
(T )
λ for the flow with intensity λ over
time T for n ≥ 1; P [N (T ) = 0] is the probability that no intervention is required for
one aircraft, given by (14).
P [N (T )λ = n] =
+∞∑
i=1





P{N (T )}[n] (23)
P [N (T )λ = 0] =
+∞∑
i=0
P [M = i] ·
(
P [N (T ) = 0]
)i
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Multiple parallel lanes If the spatial extents are identical, and assuming inde-
pendence of the flows, the whole system is equivalent to a single Poisson process with
cumulative intensities λtot =
∑
λi. Single lane results can thus be simply generalized
to (24).




If the spatial extents of the flows are different, the problem is slightly more com-
plex. The taskload probability (25) for j ≥ 2 different flows with {e1, · · · , ej} spatial
extents, {λ1, · · · , λj} intensities, and {N (T )λ1,e1 , · · · , N
(T )
λj ,ej
} interventions per flow is
P [N (T )∪λi = n] = P [N
(T )
λ1,e1
+ · · ·+N (T )λj ,ej = n]













designates the successive convolutions of the P{N (T )λi,ei} taskload prob-
abilities given in (23) for flows 1 to j. This operator is well defined since convolution
is associative.
Crossings and mergings For a minimum possible approach distance Dmin (taken
to be for example 5 NM, i.e. the conflict separation standard), the symmetrical
safe-zone boundaries x1 and x2 in each of the flows are defined by (26).
(x1 + x2 cosα−
e2
2
cosα) . . .
. . .+ (−e1
2




(x1 + x2 cosα−
e2
2
sinα)2 . . .
. . .+ (−e1
2
+ x2 sinα +
e2
2
cosα)2 = D2min (26)
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A discrete convolution [?] in (27) gives the total taskload over time T for n ≥ 1
accounting for A − 1 conflicts at the flow crossing and for N (T )λ1∪λ2 interventions to
maintain the structure.
P [N (T )λ1×λ2 = n] = P [A− 1 +N
(T )
λ1∪λ2 = n]
· · · = P{A− 1}[?]P{N (T )λ1∪λ2}
· · · =
n∑
i=0
P [A = i+ 1] · P [N (T )λ1∪λ2 = n− i] (27)
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[6] Bakker, G. J. and Blom, H. A. P., “Air traffic collision risk modeling,” in
IEEE Conference on Decision Control, 1993.
[7] Ballin, M. G., Williams, D. H., Allen, B. D., and Palmer, M. T.,
“Prototype flight management capabilities to explore temporal RNP concepts,”
in 27th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 2008.
[8] Barhydt, R., Eischeid, T. M., and Palmer, M. T., “Use of a prototype
airborne separation assurance system for resolving near-term conflicts during
autonomous aircraft operations,” in AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control
Conference, 2003.
[9] Barnier, N. and Allignol, C., “4d-trajectory deconfliction through de-
parture time adjustment,” in 8th USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D
Seminar, 2009.
[10] Basu, A., Mitchell, J. S., and Sabhnani, G. K., “Geometric algorithms
for optimal airspace design and air traffic controller workload balancing,” Jour-
nal of Experimental Algorithmics, vol. 14, p. 3, 2009.
[11] Beers, C. and Huisman, H., “Transitions between free flight and managed
airspace : a controllers perspective,” in 4th USA/Europe Air Traffic Manage-
ment R&D Seminar, 2006.
132
[12] Bigelow, M., “Examining the relative costs and benefits of shifting the lo-
cus of control in a novel air traffic management environment via multi-agent
dynamic analysis and simulation,” Master’s thesis, Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology, 2011.
[13] Bigelow, M. and Pritchett, A. R., “The relative costs and benefits of locus
of control with novel air traffic management concepts,” in Integrated Commu-
nications, Navigation, and Surveillance Conference, 2011.
[14] Bilimoria, K. D., Sridhar, B., Chatterji, G. B., Sheth, K. S., and
Grabbe, S., “FACET: Future ATM concepts evaluation tool,” Air Traffic
Control Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 1, 2001.
[15] Blin, K., Akian, M., Bonnans, F., Hoffman, E., and Zeghal, K., “A
stochastic conflict detection method integrating planned heading and velocity
changes,” in IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2000.
[16] Blom, H., Bakker, G., Blanker, P., Daams, J., Everdij, M., and
Klompstra, M., “Accident risk assessment for advanced air traffic manage-
ment,” Tech. Rep. NLR-TP-2001-642, Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlabora-
torium (NLR), 2001.
[17] Blom, H., Bakker, G., Everdij, M., and Van der Park, M., “Collision
risk modeling of air traffic,” in European Control Conference, 2003.
[18] Blom, H., Bakker, G., Obbink, B. K., and Klompstra, M., “Free flight
safety risk modelling and simulation,” in 2nd International Conference on Re-
search in Air Transportation, 2006.
[19] Blom, H. A. P. and Bakker, G., “Conflict probability and incrossing proba-
bility in air traffic management,” in IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,
2002.
[20] Boucek, G., Veitengruber, J., and Smith, W., “Aircraft alerting systems
criteria study: Vol. 2. human factors guidelines for aircraft alerting systems,”
Tech. Rep. FAA-RD-76-222, II, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Wash-
ington, D.C., 1977.
[21] Chen, B. and Cheng, H. H., “A review of the applications of agent technol-
ogy in traffic and transportation systems,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 485–497, 2010.
[22] Clark, J., “System of systems engineering and family of systems engineer-
ing from a standards, V-Model, and Dual-V Model perspective,” in 3rd IEEE
Systems Conference, pp. 381–387, 2009.
[23] Clarke, J.-P., Ho, N., Ren, L., Brown, J., Elmer, K., Tong, K.-
O., and Wat, J., “Continuous descent approach: Design and flight test for
133
Louisville International Airport,” Journal of Aircraft, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 1054–
1066, 2004.
[24] Cleveland, W., “Improving pilot understanding of TCAS through the traffic
situation display,” Master’s thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2012.
[25] Cohen, C. E., Cobb, H. S., Lawrence, D. G., Pervan, B. S., Pow-
ell, J. D., and Parkinson, B. W., “Autolanding a 737 using GPS integrity
beacons,” Navigation, vol. 42, pp. 467–486, 1995.
[26] Comerford, D. A., “Recommendations for a cockpit display that integrates
weather information with traffic information,” tech. rep., NASA Ames Research
Center, 2004.
[27] Conker, R. S., Moch-Mooney, D. A., and an Brian T. Simmons, W.
P. N., “New process for ”clean sheet” airspace design and evaluation,” in 7th
USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar, 2007.
[28] Consiglio, M. C., Hoadley, S. T., Wing, D. J., and Baxley, B. T.,
“Safety performance of airborne separation: Preliminary baseline testing,” in
7th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference, 2007.
[29] Consiglio, M. C., Wilson, S. R., Sturdy, J., Murdoch, J. L., and
Wing, D. J., “Human in the loop simulation measures of pilot response delay
in a self-separation concept of operations,” in 27th International Congress of
the Aeronautical Sciences, 2010.
[30] Coppenbarger, R. A., Mead, R. W., and Sweet, D. N., “Field evalu-
ation of the tailored arrivals concept for datalink-enabled continuous descent
approach,” Journal of Aircraft, vol. 46, pp. 1200–1209, 2009.
[31] den Braven, W. and Schade, J., “Concept and operation of the performance
data analysis and reporting system (PDARS),” in Proceedings of the 2003 SAE
International Advances in Aviation Safety Conference, 2003.
[32] Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Acquistion Guidebook, ch. Chap-
ter 4 - Systems Engineering. Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 2012.
https://dag.dau.mil.
[33] Donohue, G. L. and Laska, W. D., “United States and European air-
port capacity assessment using the GMU macroscopic capacity model,” in
3rd USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar, vol. 193, pp. 61–76,
IAAA; 1992, 2000.
[34] Dunlay, W. J., “Analytical models of perceived air traffic control conflicts,”
Transportation Science, vol. 9, pp. 149–164, May 1975.
[35] Durso, F. T. and Manning, C. A., “Air traffic control,” Reviews of Human
Factors and Ergonomics, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 195–244, 2008.
134
[36] Dwyer, J. and Landry, S., “Separation assurance and collision avoidance
concepts for the next generation air transportation system,” in Human Interface
and the Management of Information. Information and Interaction (Salvendy,
G. and Smith, M., eds.), vol. 5618 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pp. 748–757, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009.
[37] Endsley, M. R., Mogford, R., Allendoerfer, K., Snyder, M., and
Stein, E. S., “Effect of free flight conditions on controller performance, work-
load, and situation awareness: A preliminary investigation of changes in locus of
control using existing technology,” Tech. Rep. DOT/FAA/CT-TN97/12, Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA), 1997.
[38] Erzberger, H., “The automated airspace concept,” in 4th USA /Europe Air
Traffic Management R&D Seminar, 2001.
[39] Ester, M., Kriegel, H.-P., S, J., and Xu, X., “A density-based algorithm
for discovering clusters in large spatial databases with noise,” in Second Inter-
national Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 1996.
[40] Farmer, E. and Brownson, A., “Review of workload measurement, analysis
and interpretation methods,” tech. rep., Eurocontrol, 2003.
[41] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “8260.3B - United States stan-
dard for terminal instrument procedures (TERPS),” 1976.
[42] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Airspace Management Hand-
book, 2.1 ed., 2004.
[43] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Roadmap for performance-
based navigation,” tech. rep., 2006.
[44] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “14 CFR part 91: Automatic
dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) out performance requirements to
support air traffic control (ATC) service; final rule.” Federal Register, Vol. 75,
No. 103, 2010.
[45] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “FAA’s NextGen implementa-
tion plan,” tech. rep., 2010.
[46] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Introduction to TCAS II ver-
sion 7.1,” Tech. Rep. HQ-111358, Washington, D.C., February 2011.
[47] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “FAA aerospace forecast fiscal
years 2012-2032,” tech. rep., 2012.
[48] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Order JO 7400.2J : Proce-
dures for handling airspace matters,” 2012.
135
[49] Forsberg, K., Mooz, H., and Cotterman, H., Visualizing project man-
agement: a model for business and technical sucess. John Wiley and Sons,
2000.
[50] Fowler, D., Le Galo, G., Perrin, E., and Thomas, S., “So its reliable
but is it safe? a more balanced approach to ATM safety assessment,” in 7th
USA/Europe ATM R&D Seminar, vol. 41, pp. 02–05, Citeseer, 2007.
[51] Gariel, M., Toward a Graceful Degradation of Air Traffic Management Sys-
tems. PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010.
[52] Gariel, M., Srivastava, A. N., and Feron, E., “Trajectory clustering
and an application to airspace monitoring,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1511–1524, 2011.
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